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6EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
Social media manager, Airbnb host, influencer,  
SEO specialist, app developer, Uber driver, 
driverless car engineer, podcast producer  
and drone operator; these are just some  
of the jobs that did not exist 10 years ago.  
What will happen in the future? What will today's 
10-year-olds do when they are 25? What kind 
of jobs will disappear, what will be created and 
why? Which new skills will be valuable in the job 
market? What new forms of work are emerging?
In the European Union (EU), the technological 
revolution is causing significant changes  
in the world of work. Some jobs are at risk of being 
lost to machines. Others are being transformed 
and new ones are being created. As a result,  
the skills we need are also changing. At the same 
time, new forms of employment are on the rise. 
Occupational structures are shifting, often leading 
to polarisation in employment and wages which  
in turn, can increase inequalities. 
New technologies will reshape millions  
of jobs in the EU
Some jobs are highly vulnerable to automation.  
The jobs that are most exposed to automation 
appear to be those that require relatively low 
levels of formal education, those that do not 
involve relatively complex social interaction  
and those that involve routine manual tasks.
Technology also creates new jobs. 
New jobs related to the development, maintenance 
and upgrading of artificial intelligence (AI) 
technologies and big data infrastructures are 
among those expected to grow. Yet, it is difficult 
to know in advance how many jobs like these will 
be created, and in what sectors they will emerge. 
Nevertheless, the kinds of jobs that are predicted 
to grow the most in the EU-28 by 2030 appear to 
be those that require higher education, intensive 
use of social and interpretative skills, and at least 
a basic knowledge of ICT.
However, new technologies affect tasks,  
not jobs. This explains why digital technologies 
do not simply create and destroy jobs: they also 
change what people do on the job, and how they do it. 
Job profiles could change substantially through 
the addition of new tasks or the modification  
of existing ones, requiring workers to adapt  
to new working methods, work organisation 
and tools. For example, the use of computers 
in the workplace has already had an impact on 
the nature of work: it appears to have shifted 
employment towards jobs with less routine 
and more social tasks. At the same time, 
computerisation has made work in certain jobs 
more repetitive and dependent on production 
targets and quality standards.  
This standardisation of work may pave the way 
for automation in the future.
Human-centred work organisation is the ultimate 
barrier to job automation. The aspects of work 
that require key attributes of human labour, such 
as creativity, full autonomy and sociability, are 
beyond the current capabilities of advanced AI. 
However, when work is organised in a discrete, 
standardised and predictable way, the automation 
of work becomes far more feasible.
Therefore, any reconfiguration of jobs due to 
the new technologies will entail the adaptation, 
Executive summary
7shifting and modification of roles — and thus, skills 
and knowledge. What are the implications of these 
changes in terms of skills and education?
Digital and non-cognitive skills are 
becoming increasingly necessary to seize 
emerging job opportunities
In future, it is likely that a moderate level of digital 
skills combined with strong non-cognitive skills will be 
in greater demand. The growing importance  
of both digital and non-cognitive skills is reflected  
in increasing wage differences between workers who 
are equipped with these skills and those who are not.
Yet, the digital skills shortage remains significant.  
One third of the EU labour force has no or almost  
no digital skills. Employers in the EU report that  
a large number of workers are not ready to 
respond to the rising demand for digital skills.
Workers will need non-cognitive skills to cope in an 
ever-changing workplace. It is increasingly important 
that, in addition to knowledge, individuals acquire 
skills that help them to anticipate changes and 
to become more flexible and resilient. For low-
skilled workers in particular, in the future, it will be 
harder to find employment without prior reskilling 
or upskilling. However, teaching non-cognitive 
skills seems to have been neglected across the EU 
despite its effectiveness.
But most importantly, the faster-evolving world 
requires change in the way that skills are provided. 
Europeans will need to learn throughout their 
entire life, both inside and outside of formal 
education.
Technology is a key driver of new forms 
of work
Disaggregation of work into specific tasks is happening 
across all Member States, to varying degrees. 
Technology provides incentives for employers  
to contract out work, and enables workers to work 
remotely, both as employees and freelancers.  
In fact, new forms employment such as casual 
work, ICT-based mobile work, and digitally-enabled 
forms of self-employment are gaining traction 
across the EU.
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9Platform work remains small but significant  
in the EU, involving many young people and highly 
educated workers. Around 11 % of the working age 
population (aged 16-74) have provided services  
via online platforms at least once — up from 
9.5 % in 2017. However, providing labour services 
mediated by platforms is the main work activity 
for only 1.4 % of the working-age population.  
The average age of platform workers is just below 
34 years, while close to 60 % of those who provide 
services on platforms as their main job have  
at least tertiary education.
Platform work is a clear example of how digital 
transformation can offer new job opportunities while 
creating policy challenges. Working conditions  
for platform workers vary greatly depending  
on the type of work, its intensity and frequency. 
For instance, platform workers who predominantly 
provide professional services are typically better 
paid than other platform workers, although also 
more likely to suffer from stress. Conversely, 
non-professional online platform workers, while 
experiencing less stress, are more likely to have 
lower pay and limited learning opportunities. 
Meanwhile, platform workers are at a particularly 
high risk of having unclear employment status.
Last but not least, there are significant differences 
between Member States as regards the prevalence 
of platform work, which demonstrates the 
importance of local- and regional-level analysis 
beyond EU-level averages.
The employment landscape is evolving 
differently across the EU, widening  
the gap between regions
Technological change contributes to transforming  
the overall structure of employment. However,  
the various patterns of employment restructuring 
across EU countries and regions suggests that, 
beyond technology, many other factors, including 
urbanisation, deindustrialisation and labour-market 
institutions, are at play.
Patterns of employment restructuring vary 
considerably among EU regions. Looking at  
changes in job structures across EU regions 
between 2002 and 2017, no prevalent pattern  
of employment transformation emerges. Around 
one third of regions have experienced heightened 
job polarisation. However, at the same time, there 
has been a remarkable occupational upgrading  
in some mainly rural regions while, in many  
others, the labour market structure has been 
significantly downgraded.
Capital city regions show a much larger share  
of high-paid jobs than other regions within their 
respective countries. They are also more likely  
to experience job polarisation. This is the result 
of a long-term trend which has seen capital city 
regions, and more generally highly urbanised 
areas, benefiting disproportionately from 
employment growth, mostly in the highly-paid 
segment. Meanwhile, the employment structure  
of peripheral European regions is not converging  
to that of central and northern Europe.  
For instance, the share of low-paid jobs in some 
peripheral regions is around twice as large  
as in core EU regions.
Executive summary
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INTRODUCTION
The changing nature of work and skills has 
emerged as an important and controversial 
issue in the public policy debate. Interest in this 
topic from think-tanks, businesses, international 
organisations, governments and the broader  
public has continued to grow over the last five 
years (see Figure 1). 
While a wide range of factors, such as 
globalisation, ageing or climate change, might 
impact how work and skills are being reshaped, 
the debate on the potential drivers of change 
often focuses on just one: technology. This is 
because new technologies such as robotics and AI  
are expected to have a strong and wide-ranging 
impact on the quantity, nature and organisation  
of work, as well as on skills. 
Robust evidence is essential for designing future-
proof policies that fully grasp the new opportunities 
offered by technology, whilst tackling the emerging 
challenges. Although in the last few years a vast 
amount of scientific and grey literature have 
proliferated around this topic, the evidence base  
to inform policy decisions in these areas is often 
incomplete or inconclusive, leading to confusion 
among policymakers and the public.
This JRC report on the changing nature of work  
and skills in the digital age aims to help 
policymakers and the broader public to make 
sense of the vast amount of evidence available  
on the future of work and education, while bringing 
new elements for reflection into the debate. 
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Figure 1: Google Search Volume for 'Future of Work' (Global level, peak=100) 
Source: JRC from Google Trends data
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It combines a synthesis of the most recent  
and robust scientific evidence available with 
original JRC research on issues that have often 
been overlooked by existing studies. In particular,  
the report provides new insights into the interplay 
between automation and work organisation,  
the extent and nature of platform work,  
and the patterns of occupational changes  
across EU regions.
The report is structured as follows: 
The first chapter discusses  
the impact of technology  
on employment. It summarises  
the most recent estimates  
on technology- induced job creation  
and destruction, and provides new insights  
into the role of workplace organisation  
in shaping the effect of new technologies  
on labour markets.
The second chapter discusses 
 how skills needs are shifting 
towards digital and non-cognitive 
skills, showing that education systems need  
to adapt to address labour market needs.
The third chapter reviews  
the opportunities and challenges 
related to the recent upwards trend  
in new forms of mployment in the EU, focusing  
on new data on the prevalence and characteristics  
of platform work in the EU.
The final chapter presents results 
from a new JRC-Eurofound (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living  
and Working Conditions) study on the patterns  
of occupational change in EU regions in the last 15 
years. These show increasing territorial disparities 
both between and within EU Member States.
Introduction
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and organisation  
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on skills and  
education systems. 
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SUMMARY
Technology has broad-ranging implications for labour markets: automation can 
destroy some jobs and transform many others, although new technologies create new 
jobs, too. 
Up-and-coming technologies are increasingly able to perform not only repetitive tasks 
but also less predictable ones, such as retrieving information or recognising patterns. 
Thus, a large body of research has suggested that millions of jobs could be radically 
transformed by these new technologies at some point in the future - even though 
there is disagreement on the extent of the phenomenon.
Yet, even if a machine is able to replace human labour from a purely technical 
perspective, it does not mean that it will actually happen. As shown in this chapter, the 
potential to automate a job ultimately depends on how work is organised: the more 
discrete, repetitive and predictable it is, the more susceptible to automation it becomes. 
This means that key attributes of human labour, such as autonomy, sociability and 
creativity, remain the ultimate barrier to automation. 
Meanwhile, new technologies may still create more jobs than they destroy, especially 
in occupations where social and interpretative tasks are intensive. Entirely new profiles 
dealing with developing, maintaining and upgrading new technologies are also likely 
to emerge.
1. The impact of technology on the labour market 
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13 1. The impact of technology on the labour market 
THE IMPACT 
OF TECHNOLOGY ON 
THE LABOUR MARKET 
 1.1 Automation will disrupt millions  
 of jobs in the EU 
Fears of the widespread replacement of jobs  
by machines have always accompanied phases  
of technological breakthrough. A general observation 
in the existing literature is that, to date, the 
net aggregate effect of technological change 
on employment appears to be neutral or even 
positive, once adjustment processes between firms 
and sectors have been taken into account (Craglia 
et al., 2018). Looking back, between 1999  
and 2010, recent technological change, such as 
the computerisation of work, appears to have led 
to net employment growth in the EU (Gregory  
et al., 2019), while the same appears to hold  
for the increasing deployment of industrial robots 
in manufacturing. Indeed, in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Graetz and Michaels, 2018), new  
JRC evidence suggests the absence of any 
significant negative relationship between  
the installation of robots and employment  
in manufacturing in Europe in the period 1995-
2015 (Klenert et al., forthcoming). A small but 
significant positive impact on labour productivity 
can also be observed (Jungmittag and Pesole, 
forthcoming). 
The recent accelerating pace of technological change  
is fuelling new anxieties. 
Until now, long-lasting technology-induced 
unemployment has not occurred (Mokyr et al., 
2015; Autor, 2015). Although there is still  
no empirical evidence available, some elements 
suggest that the nature of AI is different from 
previous technological change (Martens and Tolan, 
2018). The range of tasks that could potentially 
be automated is gradually expanding, increasingly 
involving tasks which cannot readily be codified, 
such as retrieving information, recognising 
patterns, and generating predictions (Brynjolfsson 
and Mitchell, 2017). Indeed, thanks to machine 
learning, and the ever-expanding collection  
of data in all domains of life, AI-enabled machines 
are grasping the ability to learn and improve  
from experience to perform a wide range  
of tasks without being explicitly programmed  
for that purpose.  
Even conservative estimates put millions of EU jobs  
at high risk of automation. A number of studies  
have attempted to estimate the proportion  
of current jobs that could technically  
Technology  
transforms, destroys 
and creates jobs,  
leading to  
profound labour  
market changes.
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be automated in the future given ongoing 
technological advancements (Box 1). These studies 
first assess the technical feasibility of automating 
existing tasks then, on this basis, provide  
an estimate of how many tasks within a certain 
job are susceptible to automation at some point  
in the future. 
Of course, it is important to keep in mind 
that these studies only refer to jobs that are 
particularly at risk of being automated; they 
remain silent on the number of jobs that  
will be created in the future. Recent survey  
   Estimates  
of the share  
of jobs that  
could be automated  
in the future  
vary widely.
Estimates of the share of jobs that could be automated  
in the future vary widely (Figure 2). Frey and Osborne 
(2013) were among the first to investigate  
the future effect on employment of recent technological 
progress. Starting from an expert assessment of the risks 
of automation, they estimated the probability  
of computerisation for 702 detailed occupations, based  
on the tasks these occupations involve. They found that 
47 % of total employment in the USA is at ‘high risk’  
of automation (defined as having a probability of being 
automated of at least 70 %). Application of Frey and 
Osborne’s (2013) methodology to the EU finds that across 
EU-28 countries, the proportion of jobs at high risk of 
computerisation ranges from around 45 % to over 60 % 
(Bowles, 2014).
Other studies argue that such an aggregated occupation-
level approach severely overestimates the potential 
impact of automation, because it neglects the substantial 
heterogeneity of tasks within occupations as well as  
the fact that workers adapt their tasks to new 
technologies (Arntz et al., 2016; 2017). 
For example, for Frey and Osborne, book-keeping, 
accounting and auditing clerks have a 98 % probability  
of their work being automated in the near future, 
irrespective of the variation in tasks across workplaces 
within this profession. However, Arntz et al. (2016)  
and Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) take into 
consideration the fact that many workers in such highly 
exposed occupations also perform tasks that machines 
struggle with, such as problem-solving or influencing.
These studies still find that it will be possible to automate 
some tasks in most jobs. However, they also show that 
fewer jobs are at high risk of automation (defined as jobs 
where 70 % of the tasks involved could be performed  
by new technology). Arntz et al. (2016) estimate that just 
9 % of jobs are at high risk of being automated across 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, with values ranging from 6 % in Korea 
to 12 % in Germany and Austria. 
Similarly, Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) find that  
the share of jobs at high risk of automation ranges 
from 6 % in Norway to 33 % in Slovakia – as against 
an average of 14 % in OECD countries. Using a different 
methodology, Lordan (2018) estimates higher shares  
of fully automatable jobs, ranging from 37 % in Norway  
to 69 % in Czechia (Figure 2).  
box 1.  Estimating the risk of automation on current jobs
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Figure 2: Estimates of the share of jobs at high risk of automation: variation across and within seminal studies 
Note: Estimates reported for Lordan (2018) refer to the share of ‘recently fully automatable jobs’, defined as jobs that could be 
automated now, or over the next decade, given ongoing technological developments. Estimates for Frey and Osborne (2013)  
refer to the share of occupations which are at high risk of automation in the USA only. 
Source: JRC from Frey and Osborne (2013), Arntz et al. (2016), Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018), Lordan (2018)
data for the United Kingdom reveal a very mixed  
set of outcomes, for both work and employment, 
from the introduction of AI for cognitive  
and physical tasks within organisations (Hunt et al., 
forthcoming). Around 40 % of those organisations 
introducing AI reported job losses, while 48 % 
reported no job losses. In terms of job creation, 
43 % of organisations reported that jobs had been 
created. As discussed in section 1.3, job creation 
may offset the job-displacement effects  
due to automation.
Differences in occupational composition and workplace 
organisation explain why the risk of job automation 
differs across countries and regions (Box 2).
Differences in industrial and occupational 
structures are often cited as the main reason  
for differences in job susceptibility to automation 
across countries and regions. For instance,  
to the extent that manufacturing is more exposed 
to automation than services, countries with larger 
shares of employment in manufacturing will show 
a higher average susceptibility to automation 
(Muro et al., 2019). However, the majority  
of differences between countries are actually 
161. The impact of technology on the labour market 
explained by differences in occupational 
composition within economic sectors, as well 
as by how tasks are designed within the same 
occupation (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018). 
This means that a given job can be more 
susceptible to automation in some countries  
or regions than in others, depending on how 
the work is organised. In France, for example, 
less than 50 % of non-managerial, professional 
and technical occupations in the textile  
and leather sector could potentially  
be automated by 2030, whereas in Poland  
this figure is close to 78 % (Eurofound, 2019b).  
In turn, work organisation can vary onsiderably 
across territories, even within the same sector 
and occupation. This can largely depend  
on the extent to which past waves  
of technology, such as ICT and industrial 
robots have been adopted (Arntz et al.,  
2016; Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018). 
  A given job 
can be more 
susceptible  
to automation  
in some countries 
or regions 
than in others 
depending 
on how work  
is organised.
By estimating the prevalence of jobs that are intensive  
in tasks more easily replaced by new technologies,  
it is possible to compare the potential risk that different 
geographical areas will face in future in terms  
of job automation. 
The last OECD Regional Outlook (OECD, 2019b) shows that 
the prevalence of jobs at risk of automation is much higher 
than average for the sample in eastern Europe (Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Poland) and southern Europe (Greece, Spain),  
while Nordic countries and the UK seem to face  
a lower risk (Figure 3). 
If we analyse differences at the regional level (as 
presented in Chapter 4, with complementary analyses  
on shifts in occupational structures at regional level  
in the EU over the last 20 years), it is obvious that there 
is an important gap in some countries between capital 
city regions and the rest of the territory. This is especially 
the case in Slovakia, France and Czechia, although  
the same thing occurs in most other countries. 
This tendency could be explained by the comparatively 
higher share of high-paid jobs located in many capital city 
regions, as shown in Chapter 4. The higher potential these 
regions usually have, when attracting investments and 
human capital from other areas, may also play a role. 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 provide more data and arguments  
to support this explanation.
box 2.  The exposure of regions  
to the challenge of automation
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box 2.  The exposure of regions  
to the challenge of automation
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Figure 3: Percentage of jobs at high risk of automation; highest- and lowest-performing regions by country, 2016
Note: High risk of automation refers to the share of workers in jobs facing a risk of automation of 70 % or above. Data from Germany 
correspond to 2013. For Flanders (Belgium), sub-regions are considered (corresponding to NUTS 2 level of the European classification). 
Source: OECD (2019b), OECD (2018b) based on Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018)
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The risk of automation also differs significantly across 
occupations (Figure 4). The types of jobs most 
exposed to automation appear to be:
• Jobs that require relatively low levels of formal  
 education (food preparation, machine operators 
 in manufacturing, personal service occupations, 
 administrative support workers).
• Occupations that do not involve relatively  
 complex social interaction, such as influencing  
 or persuading others, assisting and caring  
 for others, training others or managing other 
 people’s work (drivers and machine-plant  
 operators, cleaners and helpers, general  
 and keyboard clerks).
• Occupations that involve routine manual tasks 
 (such as assemblers).
More research is needed to fully gauge the potential 
effects of automation on the future of work.  
The estimates presented above on the share of 
jobs at high risk of automation represent  
a key starting point for assessing the risk of job 
automation from a purely technical perspective. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that 
the possibility of actually automating a job 
depends on a range of interrelated factors which 
go well beyond the mere technical feasibility of 
automation. Indeed, predicting the automation 
potential of a job requires strong assumptions 
about future demand for goods and services, 
organisation of production processes, rate  
of adoption of technologies, cultural and 
institutional factors, and changes in consumer 
preferences (Manyika et al., 2017). Meanwhile,  
a lack of high-quality data on the nature  
of work, workplace organisation, and human-
Figure 4: Occupations expected to be most and least affected by automation
Source: Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018)
Jobs that require relatively low levels of formal 
education or do not involve relatively complex 
social interaction are most exposed to automation.
Average probability of automation by type of occupation.
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machine complementarity further complicates  
our understanding of the impact of new 
technologies on the future of work (Frank et al., 
2019). This calls for greater efforts to support  
the collection of reliable data in these domains.
 1.2 Advanced technologies could 
 radically transform the world  
 of work 
New technologies can now spread across workplaces 
and societies faster than ever. Over the past century, 
the time needed for a new technology to reach 
a large share of the population has declined 
remarkably. In the USA, it took only 7 years  
for the internet to be accessed by one quarter 
of the population, against 16 years for personal 
computers, and 35 for telephones (Figure 5). This 
is also true for the EU, where the use  
of computers at work has expanded considerably 
over the past couple of decades, growing on 
average by over 64 % across all sectors and 
occupations in the EU-15 (Bisello et al., 2019). 
The scope for the industrial application  
of AI technologies is also expanding quickly. 
The number of patents in the field of AI,  
and machine learning in particular, has been 
growing at an exponential rate, surging by an 
average of 28 % a year between 2012 and 2017 
(WIPO, 2019). Most of this growth has been  
driven by patent applications in the field of 
machine learning, which represented about 89 %  
of AI-related patents in 2017 (ibid.). Meanwhile,  
the fact that most of the patents for machine 
learning aim to develop industrial applications 
suggests a growing interest in the practical  
use of AI technologies (ibid.).
Figure 5: The accelerating pace of technology diffusion
Source: Singularity.com
Existing estimates concur that a large share of jobs 
will be transformed as a result of technological 
progress. For example, Nedelkoska and Quintini 
(2018) find that 32 % of jobs across OECD 
countries have a 50 70 % chance of being 
automated. This means that even if these jobs will 
not be completely automated, the majority  
of the tasks they involve may be. In most cases, 
machines replace specific tasks but not others, 
changing the content of jobs and occupations.
Digital technologies not only determine job losses  
or creation but also shape the content and methods  
of work by changing what people do on the job, 
and how they do it. Job profiles could change 
substantially through the addition of new 
tasks or modification of existing ones, requiring 
the adaptation by workers to new jobs, work 
organisation and work tools. This is because 
technological transformations contribute to 
changes in the tasks involved in jobs (Bisello et 
al., 2019). Eurostat data show that for 21 % of 
individuals whose work involved using any type 
of computer, portable device or computerised 
equipment or machinery, the main job tasks 
changed as a result of the introduction of new 
software or computerised equipment (2018).
The use of computers in the workplace has fostered  
a shift in employment towards jobs with less routine 
and more social tasks. A new JRC-Eurofound 
analysis of changes in the task content and 
methods of work across EU-15 countries shows 
that the routine content of work is decreasing as 
jobs intensive in routine tasks are more easily 
displaced by automation (Bisello et al., 2019). 
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The number of patents in the field of 
Artificial Intelligence increased at an 
exponential rate, surging by an average 
of 28 % a year between 2012 and 2017
Figure 6: Growth of AI patent families and scientific publications 
Source: WIPO (2019)
  Robotics  
and AI have  
the potential  
to reconfigure jobs.
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The study shows that, in the last 20 years, jobs 
involving more social tasks – i.e. those tasks whose 
primary aim is direct interaction with other people 
– have expanded in relation to the rest. However, 
it also shows a remarkable, but often overlooked 
consistency: work in the remaining jobs is actually 
becoming more repetitive and standardised. 
At the same time, computerisation has also 
standardised work in certain jobs, while reducing  
the need for direct social interaction in some sectors.
Some occupations which were scarcely routinised 
in 1995, such as professionals, technicians and 
managers, have witnessed a rapid expansion in 
the use of computers since then. Thus, computers 
seem to create a somewhat contradictory effect: 
they replace routine tasks — and thus displace 
labour towards non-routine tasks and occupations 
— while, at the same time, routinising the 
remaining tasks and occupations (see Figure 7). 
Looking at occupations within specific sectors 
provides insights into how the interaction between 
the computerisation and standardisation of work 
may contribute to reducing the amount of social 
interaction in certain jobs. In fact, the extent of 
social interaction has declined in particular in those 
service-sector jobs which have simultaneously 
seen a rapid increase in the standardisation and 
computerisation of work, such as:
• Mid-level jobs in financial intermediation. Online  
and mobile banking and the increasing use  
of cash-free payments through digital 
interfaces have radically changed banking 
and financial services (Cedefop, 2016b). 
Many tasks involving processing payments, 
developing routine sources of information 
or maintaining records are increasingly 
being dealt with in a highly automated or 
algorithmic way. As a result, workers in 
financial intermediation, from clerical support  
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The growing use of computers is associated
with greater standardisation of work procedures 
in some occupations, such as professionals, 
technicians and managers, which were little 
routinized in 1995. 
Figure 7: Linking the rise of computer use at work with the standardisation of work 
Source: JRC from Bisello et al (2019)
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Figure 8: Linking the risk of automation and methods of work across 38 occupations 
Note: The closer the value is to 1, the greater the relevance of a given method of work for that occupation.
Source: : JRC based on European Jobs Monitor Task Indicator dataset, Eurofound (2016) and Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018)
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to technicians, have seen an increasing  
use of computers combined with declining 
direct social interaction and the growing 
standardisation of work procedures. 
• A similar pattern can be observed across  
a number of other jobs, such as clerical  
support workers in public administration,  
services and sales workers in hotels and 
restaurants, and professionals in real  
estate and business activities.
These developments may have paved the way  
for further automation because occupations where 
work organisation is highly routinised and social 
interaction is limited are at a higher risk  
of automation (Autor and Dorn, 2013).  
Workers are generally required to deal with 
uncertainty at work, contribute with their own 
creativity and coordinate with other workers 
within complex production processes. All these 
aspects of work require key attributes of human 
labour, such as autonomy and sociability, which 
are beyond the current capabilities of advanced 
AI-enabled machines (Deming, 2017). 
Yet, as Figure 8 shows, when work is organised  
in a very discrete, standardised and predictable 
way, the automation of work tasks becomes far 
more possible (Brynjolfsson and Mitchell, 2017).
The organisation of work is a key factor in predicting 
job automation. A specific job can be performed 
in very different ways, depending on how work is 
organised and the technologies used in production, 
with important implications for its susceptibility 
to automation. There are a number of occupations 
which, despite having a high probability of 
automation, according to existing studies, show 
a relatively low routine content along with high 
levels of social interaction. For instance, sales 
workers rank among the 10 occupations with 
the highest risk of automation (Nedelkoska and 
Quintini, 2018), although their work is usually not 
highly routinised and rich in social interactions, 
and is thus, theoretically, less prone to automation. 
Nevertheless, will sales workers be automated  
in the near future?
 
This is very difficult to predict, but crucially the 
possibility depends on the technology and social 
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  When work 
is organised in 
a very discrete, 
standardised and 
predictable way,  
the automation of work 
tasks becomes far more 
possible. 
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organisation of their workplaces, along with 
other factors such as consumer preferences, 
rather than on the type of tasks they carry out
at work. In fact, even for the same occupation, 
the method of work can vary considerably 
across sectors with different work organisations. 
For instance, whilst the task structure of a sales 
worker in real estate is very similar to that 
of a sales worker in the retail sector, the first 
is typically more exposed to teamwork and less 
standardised methods of work than the second, 
and thereby less exposed to automation 
(Figure 9). 
  Jobs involving 
the development, 
maintenance and 
upgrading of new 
technologies are 
expected to proliferate 
quickly. 
Two workers in the same occupation can face 
different probabilities of seeing their job 
automated, and this largely depends on how 
their work is organised.
The sales worker in the real estate sector does much more teamwork and is less 
subject to standardised work procedures (e.g. meeting performance targets or 
precise quality standards) than the sale worker in retail trade. This may make the 
sales worker in real estate less exposed to automation.
Task indexes
Sales workers in retail trade Sales workers in real-estate activities
Serving or attending
Selling or influence
0.61
0.60
Method of work
Autonomy 0.53
Teamwork 0.39
Standardisation 0.45
0.5 100.51 0
0.61
0.66
0.44
0.97
0.05
Figure 9: Work tasks and methods for sales workers in two different sectors
Note: The indexes are constructed in a way that 0 represents the lowest possible of the task/method of work in question, and 1  
the highest possible intensity. These indexes measure the extent to which the different types of jobs (i.e. occupations in specific sectors) 
involve carrying out a certain category of task and method or work. 
Source: : European Jobs Monitor Task Indicator dataset, Eurofound (2016)
There are three different channels through which 
technological advancement can generate jobs/tasks. 
Whether the current wave of technological progress 
may lead to a net increase or decrease in employment 
ultimately depends on the relative size of the 
displacement effects (technology replacing labour in tasks 
that it used to perform) and compensating effects (see 
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011 and Acemoglu and Restrepo, 
2018 for a theoretical framework):
Productivity effect. The substitution 
of labour by cheaper machines reduces 
production costs, induces falling prices  
and expands demand and production  
and, in turn, employment. Moreover, new technologies 
may raise the quality of products or enable new products 
and services, raising demand and production if consumers 
value this rise in quality or these new products and 
services. This expansion of the economy increases 
demand for labour. The magnitude of the productivity 
effect on employment depends on the magnitude of the 
price elasticity of demand: if it is sufficiently high, the 
increase in demand can offset the labour-saving effect  
of technology (Bessen, 2018).
Capital accumulation effect.  
The adoption of new technologies  
implies rising demand for new machines  
and intangible capital, which increases 
demand for knowledge-based tasks and for labour tasks 
that involve producing, implementing, maintaining 
and upgrading the new technologies in use.
Reinstatement effect. New technologies 
induce the creation of new tasks for workers 
for two reasons: first, the displacement 
of workers from old tasks could make more workers 
available to take over new, more productive tasks. 
Secondly, new machines and the rise in knowledge-based 
capital may directly require new tasks (such as machine 
operation) or enable new tasks (such as platform work). 
The creation of new tasks directly counteracts the 
displacement effect by raising demand for labour.
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 1.3 Technological innovation  
 also creates new job opportunities
A number of foresight analyses suggest that the  
job-creation effects of technology may compensate 
for job destruction linked to automation (WEF, 2016; 
WEF, 2018; Cedefop and Eurofound, 2018).  
The first section of this chapter shows that 
new technologies have the potential to displace 
some workers from their tasks, even causing 
some jobs to disappear entirely. However, this 
short-term displacement effect, in which workers 
are replaced by new technologies, may be 
counteracted or even entirely compensated for 
by other effects (see Box 3). For instance, for 24 
OECD economies, Autor and Salomons (2018) 
show that while displacing employment in the 
industries where it originates, automation induces 
indirect employment gains in customer industries 
and increases in aggregate demand, ultimately 
leading to net employment growth. Similarly 
positive conclusions can be drawn from previous 
studies focusing on technologies replacing 
routine tasks, such as computers or industrial 
robots (Gregory et al., 2019; Graetz and  
Michaels, 2018). 
box 3.  How does technological progress create jobs?
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In the next decade, employment growth is likely  
to concentrate at both ends of the occupational ladder. 
Assuming that current employment trends will not 
be entirely disrupted by new technologies in the 
next 10 years, occupations that are predicted  
to grow most in the EU-28 by 2030 appear  
to be disproportionately high-education, intensive 
in social and interpretative tasks, and requiring 
at least a basic knowledge of ICT (Cedefop and 
Eurofound, 2018). However, employment in 
elementary occupations is also expected to grow, 
whereas jobs involving skilled manual tasks  
are expected to decline (Figure 10).
It is easier to determine which jobs will be affected 
by automation than to predict what types of jobs 
will be created in the years ahead. Anticipating 
future job creation is actually extremely difficult  
as it depends on technologies that do not currently 
exist or are still in their development phase.  
For example, it can be noted that about 30 %  
of new jobs created in the USA over the past  
25 years did not exist, or had just started  
to emerge at the beginning of that period  
(MGI, 2017).
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REAL DATA FOR 2000-2016 
Between 2000 and 2016 The 
number of people employed 
in sales and services 
activities grew by 11 %.
PROJECTIONS for 
2016-2030
Technological 
progress will go on 
inducing the creation 
of jobs in this sector, 
even though the 
growth will slow 
down.
Assuming no significant disruption by new technologies, employment will 
be growing mainly in occupations requiring high-education and knowledge 
of ICT. However elementary occupations are also expected to grow. 
Figure 10: Job creation driven by technological progress
Source: JRC based on Cedefop and Eurofound (2018)
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Yet, even if we cannot name the jobs that will 
appear in the future, we may be in a better 
position to describe what workers will be doing  
in these jobs. For instance, as suggested by Wilson 
et al. (2017), some of the AI-related profiles 
sought by employers may be:
Trainers – workers managing large 
amounts of data and designing 
algorithms to train AI systems; 
Explainers – workers able to interpret  
the outcomes of AI systems; 
Architects – workers responsible  
for organising AI systems and seizing 
opportunities for AI adoption; 
Ethicists – workers responsible  
for setting guidelines and ensuring  
they are upheld so that AI systems  
are accountable both internally and 
externally. 
Eurofound (2019a) suggests that advances  
in industrial robotics could generate employment 
in the provision of robotics support services 
to manufacturing firms, as well as in the 
manufacturing of robots. Roles in these areas 
would include programmers and specialists  
in robot maintenance. Although these occupations 
would not be entirely new, they would involve new 
combinations of skills. 
Job profiles involving the management and elaboration 
of large amounts of data will also be in high 
demand. As economies and technologies become 
increasingly data-driven, it will be necessary  
to expand job opportunities for data professionals. 
In 2017, data professionals already accounted  
for 3.5 % of total employment in the EU-28  
(up from 3.2 % in 2013), with percentages around 
or above 4 % in the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK (EU Data Landscape). Looking forward, this 
share is expected to approach 4 % in the EU-28  
by 2025. 
'New jobs’ may not have the same characteristics 
or emerge in the same industries and places as the 
‘old jobs’ that are being destroyed. Even if the net 
employment effect of technological change will 
ultimately be positive, the redesign of existing 
jobs and the emergence of new job roles may 
significantly transform the demand for skills. 
Therefore, in order to fully seize, and share equally, 
the potential gains from technological progress,  
it is of growing importance to anticipate and meet 
emerging skills needs (see Chapter 2).  
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SUMMARY
The digital revolution has already modified the nature of work, causing changes in 
skills demand and favouring individuals who possess both digital and non-cognitive 
skills. However, the lack of digital skills may prevent many EU workers and companies 
from fully profiting from the opportunities emerging in the digital economy. 
Non-cognitive skills are also increasingly important for labour market success. 
To adequately address future skills demand, education systems should evolve from 
being focused on simply disseminating knowledge in order to equip people with the 
necessary non-cognitive skills. Such skills would help individuals to anticipate changes 
and be more flexible, creative and resilient at work. Non-cognitive skills are also 
important for having a fulfilled life. 
The acquisition of knowledge only through formal education will not be enough to 
thrive in the constantly changing world, which calls for the implementation of a 
lifelong-learning approach. The constant re- and upskilling of workers requires greater 
cooperation between stakeholders at the local level, which could be strengthened by 
new online education tools.
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 2.1 Skills for a changing labour market
The skills demanded by employers change as digital 
technology modifies job content. Automation is 
leading to the transformation of the very nature  
of a myriad of occupations (WEF, 2018). As shown 
in Chapter 1, digital technology has penetrated the 
labour market, altering the distribution of tasks 
among people and machines. 
The greater capacity for data collection, processing 
and analytics, paired with machine learning and 
AI, entails tasks that require more analytical and 
digital skills from workers. At the same time, while 
robots, software and machines powered by AI 
perform an increasing share of the work currently 
done by humans, computers are still very poor  
at simulating human interaction. 
Digital technology is unable to substitute those 
jobs that require ‘the simultaneous use of a 
wide range of skills and involve dealing with 
unforeseen scenarios’ (Harari, 2018). In that sense, 
besides literacy and numeracy, the jobs available 
increasingly demand unique human skills (WEF, 
2018; Baldwin, 2019). Indeed, as shown 
in Figure 11, in the next decade it is expected  
that technological change will bring about a decline 
in physical tasks, and an increase in cognitive 
and social tasks, digital tools, and autonomy and 
teamwork (Cedefop, 2018). Therefore, digital and 
non-cognitive skills (see Boxes 4 and 5, respectively, 
for definitions) are likely to be in greater demand.
The EU labour market is already demanding more 
non-cognitive and digital skills, and specifically a 
combination of both. As Figure 12 shows, almost all 
the occupations that have expanded in recent years 
are either professionals or service and commercial 
managers who require a combination of ICT use 
and non-cognitive skills, e.g. to deal with customers 
and teams. Conversely, on average, occupations 
demanding low digital skills and/or poor social 
interaction and emotional capacities at work have 
declined, with a few exceptions.
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DIGITAL AND 
NON-COGNITIVE 
SKILLS IN THE NEW 
WORLD OF WORK
A fast-evolving world 
requires individuals  
to acquire digital  
and non-cognitive 
skills to improve their 
employability  
and self-fulfilment.
30
 For example, in the future, due to population 
ageing, the demand for professional carers —  
a profession that requires a diversity  
of non-cognitive skills — is expected to grow.  
This caring work, especially when provided 
for older people in their own homes, is socio-
economically important but tends to be 
undeclared and overlooked in statistics.  
For that reason, the real growth in demand  
for this occupation is usually underestimated 
in labour market forecasts. Although digital 
technology has changed the job quality of care 
managers, it has had minimal impact on the day-
to-day work of professional carers themselves. 
However, even though digital technology has yet 
to fully penetrate this sector, the digital skills 
required of carers has risen (Green et al., 2018). 
This also indicates the growing importance of the 
acquisition of basic digital skills among this group  
of workers (Carretero et al., 2015; Carretero, 2015). 
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We define digital skills according to the Council 
Recommendation of 22 May 2018 on key 
competences for lifelong learning, based on the 
European Digital Competence Framework (DigComp) 
(Vuorikari et al., 2016; Carretero et al., 2017):
‘Digital competence involves the confident, critical 
and responsible use of, and engagement with, 
digital technologies for learning, at work, and for 
participation in society. It includes information and 
data literacy, communication and collaboration, 
media literacy, digital content creation (including 
programming), safety (including digital well-being  
and competences related to cybersecurity), 
intellectual property related questions, problem 
solving and critical thinking.’
box 4.  Digital skills
Figure 11: Change in the task content, methods and tools of work indexes in the EU, 2015 to 2030
Source: Eurofound (2018c), Wage and task profiles of employment in Europe in 2030, p. 8
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Non-cognitive skills are referred to in the literature in 
different ways: soft skills, personality traits, character 
skills, human literacy, 21st century skills, life skills, key 
competences, or social and emotional skills. This is 
because non-cognitive skills relate to individuals’ different 
properties or attributes (Kautz et al., 2014; Sánchez-Puerta 
et al., 2016).
Indeed, in the empirical research, non-cognitive skills 
refer among others to: open-mindedness, openness to 
learn and to change, flexibility, curiosity, innovation, 
creativity, entrepreneurship, resilience, planning/
organisation, responsibility, persistence, teamwork, 
communication, initiative, sociability, empathy, 
collaboration, emotional control and positivity. 
 
There have been some attempts to classify non-cognitive 
skills, mainly in the field of psychology – for instance, the 
Big Five taxonomy (Goldsmith et al., 1987; Almlund et al., 
2011). The importance of non-cognitive skills has long 
been overlooked in most contemporary policy discussions 
and in economic models of choice behaviour (Kautz 
et al., 2014). The Council Recommendation of 22 May 
2018 on key competences for lifelong learning already 
acknowledged a set of non-cognitive skills for three of its 
eight key competences. In addition, the Entrepreneurship 
Competence Framework (EntreComp) includes non-
cognitive skills such as creativity, taking initiative, 
perseverance and the ability to work collaboratively 
(Bacigalupo et al., 2016).
Current evidence on the relationship between non-
cognitive skills and educational and job performance 
is mostly available at US level, but limited for the 
EU. The reasons for this lack of quantitative data on 
non-cognitive skills are diverse. The intelligence and 
achievement tests used in the educational sector and 
the labour market do not properly capture non-cognitive 
skills (Kautz et al., 2014). For example, when collecting 
information on non-cognitive skills, international surveys 
either rely on parents’ and/or teachers’ judgement or are 
based on individual perceptions, generating measurement 
error problems and comparison difficulties (Brunello and 
Schlotter, 2011).
box 5.  What are non-cognitive skills?
Figure 12: Degree  
of social tasks and 
ICT use at work across 
occupations that have 
expanded, declined  
or remained stable over 
the period 2011-16 
Source: JRC based on 
employment data from 
Cedefop and Eurofound 
(2018) and data on the task 
and tools of work from  
Bisello et al. (2019)
322. Digital and non-cognitive skills in the new world of work
A moderate level of digital skills and strong non-
cognitive skills are expected to be required for 
most jobs in the future. As technology-driven 
production processes become more complex 
and interconnected, workers are increasingly 
required to organise these processes and to 
coordinate among themselves, often by using 
digital tools. In fact, as shown in a Cedefop study, 
most of the jobs which are anticipated to expand 
until 2025 require at least a moderate level of 
digital skills combined with strong non-cognitive 
skills (e.g. communication and teamwork) (see 
Figure 13). Another study argues that in order 
to cope in unknown and evolving circumstances 
— which best characterises expected future 
work environments — jobs will require workers 
to be equipped with diverse skills: cognitive 
and meta-cognitive skills (e.g. critical thinking, 
  Jobs anticipated 
to expand in the 
future will require 
at least a moderate 
level of digital skills 
combined with strong 
non-cognitive skills. 
Figure 13: Average degree of importance of skills across jobs with a positive employment outlook, 2015-25, EU28 
Note: The levels of skills were self-declared by surveyed workers.
Source: JRC from Cedefop (2016a); Cedefop European skills and jobs survey; Cedefop European skills forecasts
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The probability of being in a high-paying job is greatest for workers combining 
non-routine tasks (which typically require a strong set of non-cognitive skills) 
with moderate to advanced use of ICT
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Figure 14: Jobs combining non-routine tasks with ICT use are most likely to be highly paid (% of workers by wage 
quartile and type of job)
Note: To identify workers in (non-)routine jobs, the following question from the European Skills and Jobs Survey (ESJ) has been 
used: ‘How often, if at all, does your job involve responding to non-routine situations during the course of your daily work?’ Workers 
responding ‘Always’ or ‘Usually’ were considered to be in non-routine jobs, and those responding ‘Sometimes’ or ‘Never’ in routine jobs. 
Based on the question ‘Which of the following best describes the highest level of ICT knowledge required to do your job?’ workers were 
divided into two groups: those who responded ‘Moderate or Advanced’ use of ICT, and those who reported ‘Low or No’ use of ICT. 
High (low) wage individuals are those in the top (bottom) quartile of the income distribution. 
Source: JRC based on Cedefop's European Skills and Jobs Survey (microdata, 2016)
creative thinking, learning to learn and self-
regulation); non-cognitive skills (e.g. empathy and 
collaboration); and digital skills (e.g. using  
new digital devices) (OECD, 2018b).
Digital skills and non-cognitive skills are linked 
to larger wage premiums. Wage differences are 
widening between workers who are equipped with 
these skills and those who are not. In fact, as 
shown in Figure 14, the probability of being in a 
high-paying job is greatest for workers combining 
non-routine tasks (which typically require a strong 
set of non-cognitive skills) with moderate  
to advanced use of ICT. Survey data across  
the EU-28 reveal that more than 32 % of these 
workers are in the top quartile of the wage 
distribution. In comparison, only 16 % of workers 
who perform non-routine tasks with little or no 
knowledge of ICT are found in the same wage 
quartile. Similarly, workers in routine jobs requiring 
the use of ICT are twice as likely to be at the top 
of wage distribution. 
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Figure 15: Digital skills in the EU’s active labour force, 2017 (% individuals, by skills level)
Note: Active labour force refers to both employed and unemployed. Each worker’s competences are evaluated across four domains 
of the European Digital Competence Framework (DigComp): information, communication, content creation and problem-solving. A 
person who has not used the internet in the last three months or has never used it, or ticked ‘none’ in all four domains has been classified 
as a person with ‘no skills’. To be classified as having a low level of skills, an individual has to answer ‘none’ in one to three domains. 
Basic skills mean that an individual has answered at least ‘basic’ in all four domains. To be classified as above basic, the individual  
has to score above basic in all dimensions. Data are not available for Italy.
Source: Eurostat (isoc_sk_dskl_i)
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 2.2 The EU labour force has  
 an insufficient level of digital skills
One third of the EU’s active labour force has no or only 
a low level of digital skills. According to the Digital 
Economy and Society Index (DESI), in 2017, 10 %  
of the EU active labour force lacked digital skills, 
and a further 26 % reported only a low level 
of digital skills (Figure 15). Indeed, in a recent 
Vodafone study, 1 in 5 people aged 18-24 across 
15 countries1 admitted that they feel under-
prepared for the digital economy (YouGov, 2018). 
DESI also shows the huge variation across Member 
States: the share of active labour force with basic 
or above basic digital skills ranges from only 34 % 
in Bulgaria to 89% in Luxembourg. Digital skills 
are particularly low among people with no, or low 
to medium formal education and the unemployed 
(DESI, 2018, 2019).
European employers report that a large share  
of workers seem not ready to respond to the rising 
demand for digital skills. A European Commission 
study (Curtarelli et al., 2017) pointed out 
that around one in seven employers (15 %) 
consider that some of their staff are not fully 
proficient when carrying out tasks using digital 
technologies at work, and therefore report  
digital skills gaps among their workforce.  
This is problematic given the increasing 
digitalisation of different areas of life and work, 
and the expected automation of a number  
of work-related tasks. Indeed, around 90 %  
of occupations now require digital skills 
(Curtarelli et al., 2017; Servoz, 2019).  
Digital skills can compensate for a lack of formal 
higher qualifications, while the opposite does  
not hold true and the lack of digital literacy  
may severely impair wage prospects (Falck  
et al., 2016; Lane and Conlon, 2016). As seen 
in Figure 16, larger employers are more likely 
than smaller ones to report digital skills gaps. 
As explained by Curtarelli et al. (2017), large 
employers are more likely to have the financial 
resources to invest in new digital technologies 
than small employers, which directly translates 
into a greater demand for employees equipped 
with digital skills. 
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  Increasing 
digitalisation  
of different 
areas of life 
and work  
raises the demand  
for digital skills. 
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Figure 16: Workplaces reporting digital skill gaps by sector and size, EU28 (% of workplaces)
Note: From the responses to the following request: ‘Please provide your best estimate of the approximate number or share  
of employees carrying out such tasks and indicate how many of them are fully proficient in carrying out the tasks. Please note  
that a proficient employee is someone who is able to do the job/carrying out the task to the required level.’  
Number of valid responses: 4 569; N = 5 634 045.
Source: European Digital Skills Survey (weighted values), extracted from Curtarelli et al. (2017)
A moderate level of digital skills will be essential in 
the future, but mismatches in advanced digital skills 
are also expected in over half of the EU Member 
States in the period 2016-30. In 2018, 53 % of 
companies had difficulties in filling vacancies for 
ICT specialists (DESI, 2019). Despite the positive 
evolution in recent years, the gap between 
demand and supply for ICT specialists in the EU 
is expected to widen further. For example, due to 
the growing use of digital technologies in critical 
sectors such as transport, energy, health and 
finance, Europe can expect a shortage of skilled 
professionals to help address new digital trends, 
such as the increasing number of cybersecurity 
attacks (Negreiro and Belluomini, 2019). 
Figure 17 shows potential mismatches at 
Member State level based on a simple and static 
comparison of the projected growth in the number 
of occupations requiring advanced digital skills 
with recent trends in graduation rates. Despite 
the anticipated continuing growth in the overall 
number of ICT graduates, 14 Member States  
could face shortages in ICT graduates  
by 2030. Conversely, in those countries expected 
to experience surpluses, this is mainly because  
the demand for ICT graduates’ skills is set to grow 
at a slower pace than the predicted growth in 
supply. Yet, in a more dynamic scenario,  
if the spread of digitalisation across all sectors 
accelerates at the greater pace predicted based 
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Surplus countries
Cluster 1
Surplus of graduates due to the lower 
growth in demand for individuals with 
advanced digital skills: BG, DK, CY - 
the growth of the average annual 
number of graduates for 2013-2016* 
is higher than the implicit growth rate 
neede to meet labour demand.
Cluster 2
Surplus of graduates to shrinking 
labour market demand for higher 
education digital skills: DE, IE, EL, ES, 
FR, HU - countries that experience a 
positive growth of the average annual 
number of graduates 2013-2016* 
while a negative implicit growth rate 
world suffice to meet labour demand.
Cluster 3
Surplus of graduates due to shrinking 
labour market demand and a slower 
decrease in higher education graduates: 
AT, PL, RO, SK.
Shortage countries
Cluster 4
Shortage of graduates: BE, HR, LU, FI, 
SE - despite the positive growth of the 
average annual number of graduates in 
2013-2016* the implicit growth rate 
needed to meet labour demand is 
higher.
Cluster 5
Shortage of graduates due to the 
number of graduates falling quicker 
than the demand on the labour market: 
CZ, LV, SI.
Cluster 6
Shortage of graduates: EE, IT, LT, NL, 
PT, UK - situation when a positive 
implicit growth rate is needed to meet 
labour demand while the country is 
experiencing a negative average annual 
growth of the number of graduates
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Cluster 5
Cluster 6
Surplus countries Shortage countries
Figure 17: Projections of future demand and supply of ICT graduates in Europe 
Note: This is a simple and static approach, with the assumption that European higher education systems will continue  
to expand or decrease at the same rate as in the period 2013-16. The cluster groups correspond to six possible scenarios.  
Data for Malta are missing.
Source: JRC based on Cedefop and Eurofound (2018). Skills forecast: trends and challenges to 2030, pp. 140
on historical data, the situation may be reversed 
in the countries with projected surpluses.  
Overall, these figures imply that the evolution  
of the wage premium for advanced digital 
skills may be uneven across EU Member States, 
narrowing in those showing surpluses of 
advanced digital skills and widening where  
there are shortages. Of course, this also  
depends on the degreeof mobility of ICT 
graduates across EU countries, which could  
either ease or exacerbate projected shortages 
and surpluses.
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The limited specialised education offer in advanced 
digital skills in the EU could constrain AI penetration. 
Worldwide, the industrial application of AI 
technologies is expanding fast (cf. Chapter 1).  
A JRC analysis of 35 000 key players in AI 
confirms that intense competition is taking place 
on a global scale (Craglia et al., 2018). Although 
Europe is in a good position in terms of the quality 
of its research in this area and the number  
of start-ups (ibidem), it is still lagging behind 
Japan, Korea and the USA in the number of AI 
patents filed or granted each year (OECD, 2017). 
While the penetration rate of AI among companies 
(number of AI firms per 100 000 companies) in EU 
countries is highest in Malta and the UK – where 
AI is used by 45 and 40 companies per 100 000, 
respectively, the EU average is four times lower 
(see Figure 18).  
Further penetration of AI might be constrained by 
supply-side issues, namely the low numbers of 
graduates educated in AI.
A new JRC study aims to map existing academic 
provision in advanced digital skills in the EU in 
three technological domains: AI, high-performance 
computing (HPC), and cybersecurity. The study 
shows that provision remains low across Member 
States with significant variations across countries 
(López-Cobo et al., 2019). Overall, taking the 
Bachelor and Master’s levels together, some 
content on advanced digital skills is included  
by only 6.7 % of all tracked programmes in the EU. 
On the positive side, there are a number  
of courses in AI teaching machine-learning 
methods which may be applied to many areas  
of industry. However, programmes in HPC are not 
yet offered in 13 Member States (ibid.).
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Figure 18: AI education and AI industry penetration rates, EU
Source: López-Cobo et al., 2019
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 2.3 Non-cognitive skills are crucial  
 to thrive in the new world of work
Today, education should evolve from only 
transmitting knowledge to enabling individuals to 
participate fully in society. Traditionally, education 
systems were based on the rule that ‘yesterday’s 
problems shape the present school’ (Dalin and 
Rust, 1996). Nowadays, however, they need to 
teach people in order to prepare them to deal 
with the complexity of the world (Dominici, 2018). 
Today’s society faces a more interlinked and 
connected world. Every realm of life related to 
technological change is changing. This presents 
challenges to all citizens and calls for a rethink 
of education systems: besides knowledge, 
individuals need competences which will enable 
them to participate fully in today’s society and 
gain a sense of belonging and well-being during 
their lifespan (Kyllönen, 2019).
Nurturing non-cognitive skills is becoming 
increasingly important for individuals' success in the 
labour market. Wage heterogeneity, especially 
among highly educated workers, increasingly 
depends on individual characteristics related 
to non-cognitive skills, which currently are not 
fully covered by formal education (Altonji et al., 
2014; Card et al., 2015; Green and Henseke, 
2016; Edin et al., 2017). For example, in a sample 
of tertiary graduates working in technology-
intensive environments, those equipped with 
non-cognitive skills are more likely to be at the 
top of the wage distribution (see Figure 19). 
According to Aoun (2017), to respond to labour-
market demand in the digitised world, as well 
as learning technological and data literacy2, 
individuals should also invest in non-cognitive 
skills. The author considers creativity, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, empathy and teamwork to be the 
most fundamental skills to becoming ‘robot-proof’.
The wage premium for non-cognitive skills has 
increased over time. Although difficult to measure, 
non-cognitive skills have been connected with 
better academic and job performance (Weinberger, 
2014; Schanzenbach et al., 2016; Deming, 
2017). One potential reason for this link at job-
performance level is the rising complexity  
and interconnectedness of production processes, 
both within and across firms (Arntz et al., 2016). 
For example, as can be seen in Figure 20, analysis 
of cumulative change in real hourly wages, by 
occupation task intensity, in the USA, the returns 
on non-cognitive skills (referred to in the figure 
as ‘social’) increased strongly in the same period, 
regardless of the level of cognitive skills (referred 
to as ‘math’) (Deming, 2017). Moreover, the share 
of jobs requiring a high level of social interaction 
increased by 12 percentage points between 1980 
and 2012 (Deming, 2017).
  Non-cognitive 
skills help 
individuals  
to adapt better  
to the changing  
work and life 
environment. 
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The best-paid graduates (Top 25%) are more likely 
to have jobs where the use of non-cognitive skills is 
considered important
Problem 
solving skills
Communication 
skills
Teamworking 
skills
Planning/ 
organization 
skills
67.4
81.6
67.0
77.5
64.6
74.4
60.5
74.6
Bottom 50 % wage earnersTop 25 % wage earners
Figure 19: Share of tertiary graduates working in science, engineering or ICT who rate this skill as very 
important or essential in doing their job (% within each wage group)
Note: The sample includes workers with tertiary education (ISCED5-6) who work in science, engineering or ICT.  
The graph shows the share of workers in this sample who rated the importance of a certain skill to their job at least 8  
(on a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 is essential and 0 not at all important).
Source: JRC based on Cedefop's European Skills and Jobs Survey (microdata, 2016)
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Figure 20: Cumulative change in real hourly wages, by occupation task intensity, 1980 to 2012 (US data)
Note: Occupational task Intensities based on 1998 O*NET
Source: Deming, 2017
capacity to act upon ideas and opportunities 
to generate social, economic and cultural values 
(Bacigalupo et al., 2016).
Individuals need to learn to anticipate change and 
to be more flexible and adaptive to it. This wave of 
automation, which is bringing further robotisation 
of routine tasks, will make it harder for low-skilled  
Employers seek teamworkers who can adapt to change 
and are open to learning. Developing non-cognitive 
skills is potentially as important for succeeding in 
the labour market as having advanced numeracy 
and literacy. The World Economic Forum  
(WEF, 2015) emphasises that workers equipped 
with non-cognitive skills, such as collaboration, 
creativity, persistence, curiosity and initiative,  
are those most able to thrive in today’s 
innovation-driven economy.
For instance, data from millions of online job 
vacancies across 18 EU countries reveal that being 
able to adapt to changing situations and work in a 
team are skills which employers seek just as much 
as being able to use a computer (Figure 21). These 
data measure the skills that employers want 
and point out those skills which are important 
for them. More generally, being able to adapt to 
changes, such as a new workplace environment, 
and work in a team are non-cognitive skills 
demanded in virtually any type of occupation, 
from software developers, to shop sales assistant 
and freight handler (Cedefop, 2018).
Non-cognitive skills, such as entrepreneurial and 
creative skills, could foster forms of self-employment. 
As described later in this report, digital technology 
facilitates the emergence of new forms of work in 
the EU, which translates into a dynamic increase 
in the number of self-employed workers (see 
Chapter 3). Various indicators highlight that EU 
citizens are not entrepreneurial in their working 
life (GEM, 2018), while population surveys confirm 
insufficient provision of entrepreneurial education 
at all levels (European Commission, 2012). There 
is also a gender dimension to the problem, 
with a very significant under-representation 
of women among the entrepreneur population 
(Halabisky, 2017). Yet, being entrepreneurial 
involves more than learning the skills required 
to set up a business. As defined by EntreComp, 
entrepreneurship is transversal to any aspect  
of life and entails a broader set of knowledge, 
skills and attitudes than those required to start  
up and run a company. It refers to the generic 
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Figure 21: Most-requested skills, as mentioned in 
the Skills Online Vacancy Analysis Tool for Europe 
(Skills-OVATE) 
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workers to find employment without prior 
reskilling or upskilling (Harari, 2018).  
As it is difficult, if not impossible to predict  
what competences will be required in the future, 
citizens have to acquire adaptive competences 
in addition to knowledge. At the same time,  
a workforce needs to have the capacity  
to anticipate and assess the possible  
unintended consequences of technological 
transformations, for individual and societal 
well-being, labour justice and equality  
(Penprase, 2018; Celentano, 2019). 
This flexibility is important to facilitate smoother 
professional transitions and life adaptations. 
Promoting self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction, 
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Note: The figure refers to the 35 most mentioned skills across online vacancies gathered in the Cedefop's Skills Online Vacancy 
Analysis Tool for Europe (Skills-OVATE) between July and December 2018 across 18 EU countries.
Source: Cedefop's Skills Online Vacancy Analysis Tool for Europe (Skills-OVATE)
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which have a positive impact on both individuals 
and their communities, is also key in this respect 
(Cefai et al., 2018). Evidence suggests that 
educating individuals to become more flexible, 
resilient and creative, and to pursue personal well-
being helps them to adapt better to the changing 
work and life environment (see Box 6). 
Teaching non-cognitive skills is not covered as a core 
area across the EU, despite its effectiveness.  
The introduction of social and emotional learning 
as a key area for curricula, and as a transversal 
cross-curricular theme to develop non-cognitive 
skills among students, is highly recommended 
(Cefai et al., 2018). Some studies using Dutch 
and German data found that there is a significant 
correlation between non-cognitive skills related 
to diligence, responsibility, organisation and 
emotional control and more years of schooling 
(Van Eijck and De Graaf, 2004; Almlund et al., 
2011). Various other studies in Europe show 
positive returns on investment for school-based 
non-cognitive education programmes, in the UK 
(Clarke et al., 2015) and in Sweden (Belfield  
et al., 2015).
Yet, social and emotional learning is not 
mandatory in curricula among 17 Member States 
analysed (Cefai et al., 2018). For example, only 
half of the EU population aged 15 years and over 
agree that their school education helped them 
to develop a sense of initiative and a kind of 
entrepreneurial attitude (European Commission, 
2012). Non-cognitive skills are not prominent  
in lifelong learning in the EU. For instance, in most 
EU countries, encouraging creativity, innovation 
and entrepreneurship has not been an important 
topic in vocational education and training (VET) 
(Cedefop, 2015). 
Interactive learning contributes to the development  
of non-cognitive skills. Interactive teaching practices 
(e.g. problem-based learning (PBL), see Box 7) 
require students to work in groups and use non-
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Resilience has increasingly been identified as contributing 
to well-being and performance within education, but 
also to successfully navigating life and employment. 
New approaches include policies targeted at supporting 
parents and teachers, boosting social networks, and 
creating positive learning environments (Donlevy et al., 
2019). One example is the EU-funded EMPAQT (empathic 
and supportive teachers) programme which has pioneered 
an innovative training programme for primary school 
teachers aimed at introducing inclusive pedagogies to 
combat early school leaving. This programme focuses 
on five core teaching pillars: positive emotions, values 
and character strengths, positive purpose, positive 
coping and positive relationships. It is designed to boost 
resilience and positivity, nurture well-being and positive 
relationships, and improve overall academic success.
The literature highlights that changes in the knowledge 
and skills required by modern societies and, more 
specifically, uncertainty about the future knowledge  
that will be needed, drive heightened attention to 
creativity and the need to think about how to teach 
creativity in schools (ibid.). For example, fostering 
creativity can enhance problem-solving skills in 
individuals. A key function of education should be 
to enable pupils to become creative learners able to 
address future changes (ibid.). In addition, various 
authors stress that enhancing creativity in education 
relies more broadly on open-mindedness in teaching,  
in practice involving a change in mindset from teaching 
to learning, and towards accepting newness and 
developing an ability to take risks (Fennel, 2017).
box 6.  Educating individuals in non-cognitive skills to have a purposeful life and pursue  
personal well-being
cognitive skills in their discussions, to listen to 
one another when solving problems, or to make 
choices about their own learning (WEF, 2016).  
PBL can contribute to developing a student’s 
cognitive skills (Becker et al., 2017) and, together 
with interdisciplinary learning, can facilitate  
the acquisition of non-cognitive skills  
by emphasising the importance of flexibility  
and innovation (OECD, 2018b).
We have seen that teaching through such 
approaches may integrate the acquisition  
of non-cognitive skills such as those related  
to entrepreneurship throughout the curriculum 
(see Box 7). At the same time, interactive 
approaches to teaching, while benefiting  
the learning experience, are often more costly to 
implement than teaching via classical lectures. 
The innovative use of technology may offer 
solutions to this problem.
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Problem-based learning (PBL) is central to the 
educational approaches of many EU universities. 
A JRC analysis of 20 universities across Europe 
indicates that these forms of education are 
increasingly being integrated into the curricula  
of some of Europe's universities.
For instance, in Finland, Aalto University's Product 
Development Project courses and the Product 
Innovation Project offered at KU Leuven (Belgium) 
apply a PBL approach. At Denmark’s Aalborg Centre 
for PBL in Engineering Science and Sustainability, 
students learn through work on real cases, 
interacting with companies and public institutions.
This centre's model, which is problem and result-
oriented, teaches students how to acquire 
knowledge and skills independently and how  
to work in interdisciplinary groups.
The European Institute of Innovation  
and Technology's education programmes apply  
a challenge-based learning approach which can be 
described as learning by doing. To build a specific 
competence, students are put into a situation 
where they have to explore and take action. They 
work on real-life challenges (e.g. how to address 
climate change) and develop innovative solutions  
to address the needs of the market and society.
box 7.  Examples of problem-based learning in EU educational institutions 
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 2.4 An evolving world calls for changes 
 in how skills are provided
Individual investments in higher education are less 
rewarding than in the past. Since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the share of Europeans in the 
30-34 age group with tertiary education has 
grown significantly, satisfying the EU-28 target 
for tertiary educational attainment in 2018 (set 
at 40 %). In spite of these improvements, the 
labour market situation for young graduates has 
worsened in recent years. In many EU countries, 
the relative earnings of workers aged 25-34 with 
tertiary education has fallen in comparison to the 
earnings of workers in the same age group with 
upper secondary education (Figure 22). Although, 
in general, more highly educated workers have 
better labour market prospects than the less  
well educated, over the last decade, an increasing 
number of graduates have started to witness 
rather unexpectedly modest returns on their 
education (Castex and Dechter, 2014; Reinhold  
and Thomsen, 2015). 
The share of young workers not working in the field 
in which they were educated is growing (horizontal 
mismatch). Figure 23 shows that a large share 
of tertiary graduates aged 25-34 and employed 
in the EU-28 occupy a position in a different field 
from that in which they have been trained. The 
overall incidence of horizontal mismatch among 
this group of workers has not declined between 
2014 and 2017. It is highest in the humanities 
and, in the last three years, has increased  
in engineering.
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Figure 22: Changes in the earnings of workers aged 25-34 with tertiary education relative to those of workers  
in the same age group with upper secondary education, in selected EU countries
Note: The periods considered are: 2012-16 for AT, DK, EE, DE, EL, HU, LU, PL, SK, SE and UK; 2011-16 for BE, IE and PT; 
2011-15 for CZ, FI and ES; and 2010-14 for IT, FR and NL. 
Source: OECD
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Horizontal mismatches may indicate that people 
are not being equipped with the skills that are 
required in the labour market, partly due to 
personal choices but also because education 
systems may not be responsive to emerging skills 
needs (OECD, 2019a). One way to ensure a better 
match with the skills in demand could be to inform 
students about labour market needs by providing 
them with timely labour market analysis and better 
intelligence (e.g. employment outlook, graduate 
tracking) (Cedefop, 2018).
Greater cooperation between governments, education 
system institutions and employers can help to 
match local skills and talent. National and regional 
authorities are particularly aware of the need to 
match the job opportunities and skills demanded 
by the local business structure with existing 
educational provisions. Some innovative regions 
are mapping how skills can be developed  
by a range of institutions in their territory,  
and paying more attention to creating effective 
ways to identify market demand in terms  
of skills and jobs. For example, some regions are 
increasing cooperation between education system 
institutions and employers either by involving the 
latter in the design of student curricula across 
various levels of education or by engaging both in 
training programmes. Other regions are identifying 
their potential through local engagement with 
universities (Campillo et al., 2017) (see Box 8 for 
more examples). The potential of apprenticeships 
is increasingly being recognised in reducing skills 
mismatch and meeting skills demand in rapidly 
changing labour markets (Aggarwal, 2019).
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Figure 23: Incidence of horizontal mismatch among workers aged 25-34 with tertiary education in the EU-28
Source: Eurostat
Lifelong learning could be an adequate way  
of reskilling and upskilling individuals and preventing 
skills loss, but it needs a boost. Lifelong learning 
means that learning happens in different contexts, 
over the course of a lifetime. It takes place not only 
in schools and universities in the form of formal 
education, but also through informal3 and non-
formal education4. There is a strong consensus 
on the benefits of giving greater visibility to those 
skills and competences that people have gained 
through life and work experience. Indeed, the 
EU is responding by providing tools to validate 
informal and non-formal learning, such as the 
European inventory on validation of non-formal 
and informal learning (Cedefop et al., 2017). Whilst 
the participation of mature students and lifelong 
learners – referred to as the ‘post-traditional 
student’, over 22 years old – is already quite  
high in the USA (Hazelkorn and Edwards, 2018), 
just 11.1 % of adults (aged 25-64) participated  
in lifelong learning in 2018 in the EU-28. 
Moreover, in 2018, only 7 Member States had 
reached the Europe 2020 target (15 % of adults 
aged 25-64 should participate in lifelong learning 
by 2020) (see Figure 24). People most in need  
of education, training and upskilling (older people, 
low skilled and unemployed people) are less likely 
to participate in learning activities (Cedefop, 
2017). In addition, participation in training  
is observed as being lower among workers  
in jobs at high risk of automation.
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The Regional Observatory of Higher Education (ORES) 
and Regional Observatory of Employment and Training 
(OREF) in the Centre-Val de Loire region, France, play 
an important part in the region’s strategic orientations 
and prospective studies. Both observatories have shared 
databases to track student cohorts and enhance the link 
between education and employment (Arregui-Pabollet  
et al., 2018). 
Aalborg University in Denmark cooperates with key 
partners to jointly develop course curricula. The University 
of Trieste in Italy also actively involves regional firms in 
curriculum design. Some universities taking part in the 
knowledge and innovation communities at the European 
Institute of Innovation and Technology conduct skills 
forecasts when adopting their curricula (Tijssen et al., 
forthcoming). 
In the UK, more prominence has been given to employers 
when designing the occupational standards upon which 
the apprenticeship system is founded (Cedefop, 2018).  
In addition, the Employer Skills Survey (ESS) provides a 
robust picture of skills needs and training investment  
in the UK.
In Lithuania, in 2014-15, the Ministry of Education  
and Science signed collaboration agreements with  
eight employers’ associations to involve them in planning, 
implementation and review of vocational and educational 
training (VET) (European Commission, 2016).
More generally, in Germany and Switzerland, VET  
is referred to as the ‘dual-corporatist model’, and training 
takes place alternatively in schools and in firms. The latter 
are financially engaged in the training programme  
and provide skills which are tailor-made for the job 
the trainee will eventually hold. Social partners of both 
employers and employees are involved at several stages  
in curriculum design, setting of occupational standards,  
and assessment.
box 8. Examples of activities addressing skills matching
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Figure 24: Share of the adult population (aged 25-64) participating in learning in 2018
Source: Eurostat [sdg_04_60] 
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Online innovations in education, such as massive 
open online courses (MOOCs), are potentially a way 
forward in helping to leverage the adult learning gap. 
Data from worldwide MOOC providers say that, in 
2018, 20 million new learners enrolled in at least 
one MOOC while the total number of learners 
surpassed 100 million (Shah, 2018). Workers 
see MOOCs as a useful tool for acquiring the 
new skills needed in the labour market and for 
keeping them updated in their field. In particular, 
data from the JRC’s MOOCKnowledge survey5 
show that workers consider MOOCs more useful 
for acquiring skills to perform better in their 
current job than for getting a better position  
(see Figure 25). This evidence suggests that 
MOOCs could overcome the lack of formal 
training opportunities and be used as a lifelong 
learning tool to reskill and upskill individuals  
who would gain occupational or even task-
specific skills in a flexible and personalised way.  
Nevertheless, it would seem that not many 
employers acknowledge the potential of MOOCs 
for reskilling or upskilling their employees, as few 
participants stated that they have used MOOCs 
during their working time (Castaño-Muñoz et 
al., 2017). Moreover, not all individuals have 
the digital skills needed for MOOC participation. 
Indeed, MOOC learners are typically well 
educated and have already acquired a good level 
of digital competence (Hansein and Reich, 2015; 
Castaño-Muñoz et al., 2017).
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Figure 25: Workers’ benefits from taking MOOCs
Note: Scale of usefulness from 1 (not useful) to 5 (very useful); n=268.
Source: JRC MOOCKnowledge survey
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SUMMARY
Technology clearly facilitates the dissemination of new forms of work: ICTs make 
working remotely easier than ever, while allowing firms to adopt a more agile and 
flexible organisation structure. Meanwhile, digital platforms enable firms and clients 
to reach hundreds of workers simultaneously, offering opportunities for many, from 
tech-savvy freelancers to taxi drivers. As this chapter shows, platform work attracts 
thousands of young people and highly educated workers in the EU. 
Besides opportunities, digital transformation also brings new policy challenges. ICTs 
create incentives for firms to contract out work, which risks making work more like 
a transaction to undertake well-defined tasks than a fully-fledged job. In fact, signs 
of an increasing fragmentation of work are already visible in the EU, not only in the 
growing number of platform workers, but also in the declining job tenure and fewer 
working hours. 
In addition, some emerging forms of work are not clearly defined by law, leaving room 
for misclassification of the employment relationship. This is particularly true for many 
platform workers who, despite faced with working schedules and a degree of auton-
omy comparable to those of an employee, do not have access to the same levels of 
job security and benefits.
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NEW FORMS OF 
WORK IN THE EU 
 3.1 Technology is facilitating  
 the emergence of new forms  
 of work in the EU
In the EU, atypical forms of employment have been on 
the rise for some time. Whilst the majority of workers 
in the EU are still on permanent full-time contracts, 
the last two decades have seen a marked shift 
towards alternative forms of employment. Since 
2001, the number of both part-time and temporary 
workers has grown by over 30 %. In 2017, they 
accounted for almost 20 % and 12 %, respectively, 
of total employment in the EU. The proportion 
of self-employed workers has remained fairly 
constant at around 14 %, but the number of self-
employed workers without employees (i.e. own-
account workers) has increased significantly, by 
over 13 % between 2001 and 2017 (Figure 26). 
Since the expansion of these non-standard forms 
of employment had already started in many EU 
countries in the early 1990s, it can only be partially 
attributed to the recent wave of technological 
development. Rather, it reflects a wider range  
of interrelated factors, including demographic 
shifts, labour market deregulation, global 
competition and changing work-time preferences  
(OECD, 2019a). 
Technology is a key 
driver of new forms 
of work: greater  
flexibility but often 
more precarious  
working conditions. 
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Figure 26: Percentage change in the number of employed by professional status, EU-28, 2000-17
Source: JRC based on Eurostat's LFS series detailed Annual Result
Technology is a key driver of new forms of work. 
Whilst the previous expansion of temporary and 
part-time employment was only partially driven 
by technological change (OECD, 2019a), the role 
of the latest wave of technological development 
in facilitating the emergence of newer forms of 
work is clear. In particular, technology is leading to 
stronger work standardisation while facilitating job 
matching and reducing monitoring and supervisory 
costs. This gives employers incentives to contract 
out work while enabling workers to work remotely, 
both as employees and freelancers (see Box 9).
According to Eurofound (2015a), these new  
forms of work can be broadly classified into  
three groups: 
i. Employee-oriented forms of work  
(e.g. employee sharing, job sharing, casual 
work, interim management). This first group 
mainly includes forms of employment that  
are not confined within the traditional 
framework of a stable ‘one employer-one 
employee’ employment relationship.
 
ii. Self-employment-oriented forms of work  
(e.g. portfolio work, crowd work, collaborative 
employment) which includes options for self-
employment that are mediated by virtual 
platforms matching customers with service 
providers, as well as forms of cooperation 
among freelancers. For example, crowd 
work refers to the use of an online platform 
to enable organisations or individuals to 
access an indefinite and unknown group of 
other organisations or individuals in order to 
solve specific problems or to provide specific 
services or products in exchange for payment.
 
iii. Mixed forms of work (e.g. voucher-based work, 
ICT-based mobile work), including workers 
who have an employment status somewhere 
in-between employees and self-employed 
and, depending on the case, can be classified 
as either of the two.
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There are several possible channels through which 
technological progress can contribute to the rise in new 
work arrangements, both directly and indirectly: 
1. Technological change leads to stronger work 
standardisation and the disintermediation of work 
tasks, while reducing monitoring and supervisory 
costs, thereby making it easier to contract out work.
 
2. The intensification of competitive pressure due to 
different rates of technological adoption requires firms 
to be more flexible, which may lead them to hire more 
self-employed contractors for non-core activities, 
ranging from janitorial to IT-related services. 
 
3. Technology facilitates online work arrangements 
such as short-term work that is organised and 
managed through online platforms and mobile 
applications. 
4. Technology makes people more mobile, allowing the 
self-employed (but increasingly often employees, too) 
to work from anywhere, at any time.
 
5. E-commerce platforms provide the self-employed 
and micro-enterprises with a new channel to sell 
their products and manage other aspects  
of production and product delivery.
box 9. How technology is contributing to the rise of new forms of work
However, the classification of new forms of work is 
not always so straightforward. There are situations 
where employment relationships are not clearly 
defined by legislation – as is the case for platform 
work in many EU countries – which leaves 
room for the misclassification of employment 
relationships (see section 3.3, Eurofound, 2015a, 
and Eurofound 2018b). 
With some variation, new forms of work are being 
introduced in all Member States. Among the new 
forms of dependent employment, casual work – 
whereby employees do not have a regular and 
systematic work schedule but are called on a 
daily basis when the need arises – is extremely 
widespread in the EU, with the exception of 
southern European countries (see Figure 27  
and Eurofound, 2015a). Employee-sharing 
schemes – through which a worker is jointly hired 
by a group of employers – are also becoming 
increasingly present across EU Member States, 
especially in north-western Europe. Meanwhile, 
job-sharing schemes, in which a single employer 
hires two or more workers to jointly fill a specific 
vacancy, are gaining relevance in central and 
eastern Europe. ICT-based mobile work – whereby 
workers (whether employees or self-employed) 
operate from various possible locations outside 
their employers’ premises – is gaining traction  
in the majority of EU Member States. Similarly, 
there is fast-paced diffusion of digitally enabled  
and collaborative forms of self-employment.
Source: Evidence from various papers, including: Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002); Aubert, Caroli and Roger (2006);  
Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017); and Katz and Krueger (2017)
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New work patterns are also reflected in many Member 
States in the reduction in working hours for part-time 
workers. The rapid growth of part-time employment 
over the past couple of decades (see Figure 26) 
only partly reflects changes in workers' work-time 
preferences (see section 3.3). It more likely reflects 
structural factors such as the expansion of low-wage 
occupations in the service sector, where new forms 
of employment with no guaranteed working hours 
are more typically widespread (ILO, 2018; OECD, 
2019a). In fact, since 2000, most EU Member States 
have witnessed growth in short part-time work (less 
than 19 hours a week), with increases particularly 
pronounced in those countries where on-call and 
casual work arrangements are comparatively more 
widespread (Figure 28) (OECD, 2019a).
Digital platforms may be one of the factors underpinning 
the rapid growth in high-skilled solo entrepreneurs. 
Self-employed workers without employees (i.e. own-
account workers) make up over 70 % of all  
self-employed workers in the EU. The number of own-
account workers providing specialised intellectual or 
technical services has grown markedly over the past 
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Figure 27: New forms of employment identified as increasingly relevant across European countries in 2015
Note: In line with the categories of the ‘Seventh report on economic, social and territorial cohesion’, the three geographical regions 
are defined as follows: north-western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,  
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK); southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain); and central and eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). See Eurofound (2015a)  
for a detailed definition of the various new forms of employment.
Source: JRC based on Table 1 in Eurofound (2015a)
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decade, although most of the 20 million own-account 
workers in the EU are still in low-value-added sectors, 
such as agriculture and construction. 
For instance, own-account workers operating  
in professional, scientific and technical activities, 
which often require intensive use of ICT or are 
supported by digital platforms, have expanded  
by over 35 % since 2008 (Figure 29) – and almost 
doubling in countries such as France  
and Estonia. The number of own-account 
workers has also increased significantly in other 
knowledge-intensive sectors, such as ICT and 
education. Beyond the rise of digital platforms, 
other factors, such as labour and product market 
regulation, taxation systems and workers' 
preferences may be underpinning the growth  
of high-skilled solo entrepreneurs.
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Figure 28: Short part-time employment as a share of dependent employment, all ages (%)
Note: Short part-time is defined as usually working 1-19 hours per week. 
Source: JRC from OECD (2019a)
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35 % since 2008.
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 3.2 Platform work remains small  
 but relevant in the EU
The number of EU citizens who have ever engaged in 
platform work appears to be growing. A forthcoming 
JRC study shows that, in 2018, around 11 % of 
the working-age population (aged 16-74) across 
the 16 EU Member States surveyed had provided 
services via online platforms at least once. This 
represents a small increase on the 9.5 % found in 
2017 (see Figure 30 - Box 10). 
The share of workers performing platform work as 
their main work activity remains small but significant. 
In 2018, half the platform workers provided 
services on a sporadic (2.4 %) or marginal (3.1 %) 
basis, while another 4.1 % of the working-age 
population provided labour services via platforms 
as a secondary job. Only 1.4 % of the working-age 
population were found to have provided labour 
services mediated by platforms as their main work 
activity. These figures include platform workers 
providing services both digitally (e.g. freelancing, 
clerical and data entry) and on location (e.g. 
transport, delivery, housekeeping, etc.).
3. New forms of work in the EU  
140
140
120
110
100
90
80
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Own-account 
workers in PST
Own-account 
workers in ICT
All own-account 
workers
All self- 
employed
Figure 29: Growth index for selected categories of self-employment (millions of workers in 2008=100)
Note: PST refers to professional, scientific and technical activities.
Source: JRC based on Eurostat's LFS series detailed Annual Result
In 2017, the JRC, in partnership with the Directorate-
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 
commissioned an online panel survey on digital labour 
platforms (COLLEEM I) in 14 Member States. The aim 
was to obtain an initial estimation of platform work 
and a snapshot of the main characteristics of platform 
workers, the type of services they provide, and initial 
evidence on their working conditions and motivations 
(Pesole et al., 2018). Building on that experience, a second, 
methodologically improved, survey was carried out in 
2018. In total 38 878 responses were collected from a 
representative sample of internet users aged 16-74, across 
16 Member States (Czechia and Ireland were added  
to the sample with respect to COLLEEM I). 
On the basis of the information obtained from COLLEEM 
I, the sample was optimised, targeting the population 
panels that produced more representative results. The 
broad definition of platform workers in COLLEEM II 
remains broadly the same as in COLLEEM I: Platform 
workers are those who have earned income by providing 
services via online platforms, where the match between 
provider and client is made digitally, payment is conducted 
digitally via the platform, and work is either (location-
independent) web-based or performed on location.
For the purpose of the study, platform workers are 
classified according to use frequency, hours and income 
generated from platform work, in the following way:
• Sporadic platform workers are those who have 
provided labour services via platforms less than 
 once a month over the past year. 
 
• Marginal platform workers are those who provide 
labour services via platforms at least monthly,  
but who spend less than 10 hours a week working  
on platforms and get less than 25 % of their  
income via platforms.
• Secondary platform workers are those who provide 
labour services via platforms at least monthly, 
and spend between 10 and 19 hours working on 
platforms, or get between 25 % and 50 % of their 
income via platforms. 
• Main platform workers are those who provide labour 
services via platforms at least monthly, and work on 
platforms at least 20 hours a week, or get at least 
50 % of their income via platforms.
However, knowledge obtained from COLLEEM I resulted in 
a fine-tuning of the classification. While in COLLEEM I the 
relative importance of the income earned on platforms 
was the unique criterion for classifying workers, the current 
classification gives the same importance to the income 
and working hours of platform workers. The comparability 
is not compromised as the revised classification can be 
reconstructed using the 2017 data. 
59 3. New forms of work in the EU   
Total
11.0%
Sporadic
2.4%
3.1%
4.1%
1.4%
Marginal Secondary 
job
Main 
job
Figure 30: Average share of platform workers in 
2018 in 16 EU countries, total and by work intensity 
on the platform
Note: Figures refer to the 16 EU countries included in 
the COLLEEM II survey.
Source: JRC's COLLEEM II survey
box 10.  Building on the experience of the 2017 COLLEEM survey
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There are significant differences in the extent and 
nature of platform work across EU Member states. 
Among the 16 EU Member States surveyed, 
the highest share of workers providing services 
through platforms is found in Spain (18 %), 
followed by the Netherlands (14 %) and Portugal 
(13 %). Other countries with above-average 
shares of platform work are Ireland, the UK and 
Germany, whereas Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia 
show relatively lower values. Only in Spain and 
the Netherlands is the share of platform workers 
operating on platforms as their main job above 
2 %, whereas in countries such as Ireland and  
the UK, there is a comparatively higher share  
of workers performing platform work as a 
secondary job (Figure 31). 
Of course, differences between countries in 
the extent of platform work do not only reflect 
workers' preferences for this type of work, but 
also the different degrees of market penetration 
of the main labour platforms. For instance, Uber 
– one of the platforms most cited by workers 
surveyed in COLLEEM II – is fully or partially 
banned in some countries (e.g. Germany) but not 
in others (e.g. the UK).
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Figure 31: Share of platform workers across 16 EU Member States, total and by work intensity on the platform
Source: JRC's COLLEEM II survey
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The typical European platform worker is a young male 
although the proportion of young women is growing 
rapidly. The average age of platform workers is just 
under 34. Young people aged 16-25 are particularly 
highly represented, accounting for over 26 % of 
all secondary platform workers and 23 % of main 
platform workers. 
Whilst male platform workers under the age  
of 35 represent around 37 % of all platform  
workers (overall, two thirds of platform workers 
are male), the proportion of young women appears 
to be growing rapidly. As regards COLLEEM I,  
the fraction of young women performing platform 
work as a secondary or main activity increased 
by approximately 6.4 and 7.1 percentage points, 
respectively. 
Platform workers are more likely to live in larger 
households, have family responsibilities, and be  
foreign-born than ‘offline’ workers. Over one third  
of main and secondary platform workers live  
in a household of four or more people (compared 
with 26.7 % of offline workers) (Figure 32). 
Meanwhile, platform workers are considerably 
more likely than offline workers to have dependent 
children, and more of them. 
In addition, over 50 % of workers who perform 
platform work as their main activity are foreign-
born, while this figure is below 7 % among offline 
workers. The share of foreign-born platform 
workers is particularly high (more than 30 %)  
in Ireland, Finland and the UK.
Platform workers tend to be more educated than 
offline ones although this is not the case among 
young cohorts. Some 58 % of platform workers 
who provide services on platforms as their main 
job have at least a tertiary level of education, 
compared to 36 % of offline workers. Among 
secondary and marginal platform workers, 
the share of highly educated workers is also 
comparatively higher, reaching 47 % and 49  %, 
respectively. However, the average level of 
education of young platform workers is lower  
than that of their offline counterparts. For instance, 
while 56 % of offline workers aged 26-35 have 
some form of tertiary education, this percentage 
drops to 49 % among young platform workers 
(Figure 32). 
The majority of platform workers in Europe provide 
highly skilled online services, but the share of  
on-location service providers is expanding. On average, 
half of the platform workers perform both online 
and on-location services and are active on two  
or more platforms. The majority of platform 
workers provide professional services (such as 
software development, writing or translation) which 
demand high skill levels. In particular, a large  
and growing proportion (40 %, up from 26 % in 
COLLEEM I) of main platform workers provide 
translation services, a trend partly reflecting the 
growing engagement of women in platform work. 
In fact, while the provision of services such as 
software development and transport are the most 
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male-dominated services, translation is mainly 
female-dominated. This also holds for on-location 
services (e.g. housekeeping) which, unlike other 
non-professional activities (e.g. micro-tasking, 
clerical work, sales), are becoming increasingly 
prevalent among platform workers.
Online platform work is a growing global phenomenon, 
with potentially significant cross-border employment 
effects. Although comprehensive data are not  
yet available on the extent and nature of service 
provision through online labour platforms,  
a number of sources agree that, while remaining 
limited, work mediated by digital platform  
is increasing worldwide. For instance, according  
to the Oxford University’s Online Labour Index,  
the use of online labour for freelance work  
– as measured on four of the largest English-
speaking online freelancing/outsourcing platforms 
– increased by around 25 % between May 2016  
and May 2019. Online freelancers are 
predominantly found in emerging and developing 
economies, while employers are mainly located  
in advanced economies, notably the USA  
and the EU. This implies that freelancers in Europe, 
especially those providing software development 
and multimedia-related services, may inevitably 
face competition from workers located in countries 
with comparatively lower average wages  
(Box 11 and Figure 33).
Share of high educated
(ISCED 5-8)
Share of those with dependants Share of those living in large 
households (4 people or more)
Share of female 
Share of male 
0 %
100 %
Main platform workers 
are more likely to have 
university-level education 
than the regular worker.
Main Platform workers are those who provide labour services via 
platforms at least monthly, and spend work on platforms at least 
20 hours a week or get at least 50% of their income via platforms.
Main platform workers
37.1
22.8
36.2
57.1
49 15.3
17.1
26.7
39
29
Main platform workers are 
likely to have dependants 
and live in larger household.
Oﬄine workers refer to survey 
respondents who are in the workforce, 
but do not provide services via platforms.
Oﬄine workers
Figure 32: Share of offline/main platform workers by type of characteristic
Note: Data are weighted using population weights.
Source: JRC COLLEM II data
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According to data from the Online Labour Index at Oxford 
University in the UK, the largest overall suppliers of 
online labour are traditional outsourcing countries in Asia, 
such as India and Bangladesh, which together account  
for over 40 % of the global market share, followed  
by the USA (12 %). 
Overall, Europe accounts for 13 of platform workers 
globally. Not surprisingly, half of these are typically 
engaged in software development and technology 
-related activities. 
These workers are found in particular in the UK and east 
European countries, whereas in southern Europe, writing 
and translation are the most common activities among 
online freelancers. Rather, workers in northern European 
countries are stronger providers of creative and multimedia 
work, as well as sales and marketing support. Overall, this 
shows that on online labour platforms, too, the distribution 
of work reflects a distinct geographical pattern, potentially 
reflecting different skill endowments among countries. 
box 11.  Where are online workers located?
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Figure 33: International division of online work by region and type of service (% market share)
Note: The worker supplement of the Online Labour Index is collected from four of the largest English-speaking online freelancing/
outsourcing platforms: Fiverr, Freelancer, Guru, and PeoplePerHour. Estimates show that these four platforms make up at least 40 % 
of the global market for platform-based online work.
Source: The Online Labour Index, Oxford University, UK
 3.3 Challenges for workers: unstable  
 jobs, unclear work relationships  
 and limited earning potential 
Short-term work contracts of one year or less are 
becoming increasingly common in the EU. In 2018, 
temporary employment accounted for around 
20 % of all dependent employment in the EU-28, 
involving more than 27 million workers. Over  
8 million of these had a work contract lasting  
less than 6 months, while close to 7 million had 
work contracts of between 6 months and 1 year. 
As shown in Figure 34, the number of workers  
with short-term work contracts of one year or 
less has increased by over 10 % since 2008. 
Furthermore, temporary contracts of a longer 
duration (at least 2 years) — which are supposedly 
more likely to represent a stepping stone towards  
better employment opportunities — have declined 
by almost 23 % over the same period. 
The declining average duration of temporary work 
contracts is part of a broader trend whereby jobs  
in advanced economies are becoming less and less 
stable (OECD, 2019a). The intensifying  
international competition, outsourcing of jobs,  
and fragmentation of work tasks enabled  
by digital labour platforms contribute significantly 
to making jobs (especially low-wage ones) 
increasingly short-lived. However, declining job 
stability also reflects greater mobility between 
jobs, as well as from dependent employment 
to self-employment. In fact, thanks to ICT 
technologies and digital labour platforms, job 
search and job matching between employees  
and employers is becoming easier and cheaper 
(OECD, 2019a). 
Part-time and temporary employment is often taken  
on involuntarily. Unlike self-employment,  
a considerable share of those working in either 
part-time or temporary employment are in such 
employment involuntarily, namely because they 
could not find a full-time or permanent job, 
respectively. As of 2018, one quarter of part-time 
65 3. New forms of work in the EU   
  The number 
of workers with 
work contracts 
of one year or 
less has increased 
by over 10 %  
since 2008.
0
2
4
6
8
Less than 
6 months
Between 
6 months 
and 1 year
Between 
1 and 2 
years
Over 2 
years
M
ill
io
ns
 o
f 
w
or
ke
rs
2008 2018
In 2018 over 15 M 
people had a work 
contract lasting 
one year or less
Figure 34: Number of workers by duration  
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Source: JRC based on Eurostat's LFS series detailed Annual Result
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workers and over half of temporary employees 
in the EU-28 were in such forms of employment 
involuntarily (Figure 35). 
While these shares have only slightly increased 
since 2006, there is still a large variation between 
EU-28 countries. The proportion of involuntary 
part-time employment ranges from over 50 %  
in some southern European countries to 10 %  
or less in most north-west European Member 
States. Involuntary temporary workers account 
for 80 % or more of all temporary employees in 
most southern and eastern European countries, 
compared with less than 20 % in central European 
countries. However, fewer than 6 % of own-
account workers in the EU-28 would rather be  
in a dependent employment role, suggesting  
that being a solo entrepreneur mainly reflects 
personal preferences and attitudes towards work.6 
The outsourcing of jobs risks blurring the line between 
dependent employment and self-employment.  
As seen above, the expansion of the digital 
economy appears to have opened doors  
for independent highly skilled professionals.  
However, across the EU-27 countries, some own-
account workers find themselves in ambiguous 
work relationships, closer to dependent employment 
than self-employment. The so-called ‘economically 
dependent’ self-employed are own-account workers 
who have one client from whom they earn at least 
50 % of their total income.
In some cases, despite being registered as  
self-employed, the dependent self-employed  
also have little or no autonomy as to what they 
do at work, or how they do it. For instance, 
more than one third of dependent own-account 
workers have no autonomy, and another quarter 
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Figure 35: Share of involuntary employment in the EU-28, by type of employment
Note: The rage of variation across EU-28 countries is not provided for involuntary own-account work, due to limited data availability.
Source: JRC based on Eurostat LFS series detailed Annual Result and LFS ad-hoc module on Self-Employment (2017)
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have no discretion as to either the content or the 
organisation of work (Figure 36). This means that 
dependent self-employed workers often face work 
schedules and organisation that are essentially 
comparable to those of employees, but without 
having access to the same level of job security 
and social benefits. This is why dependent self-
employment is also referred to as ‘concealed’ self-
employment (Eurofound, 2017a). Moreover, there 
is evidence that, despite taking on more financial 
risks as self-employed workers, monetary returns 
for this type of self-employment do not outweigh 
those of employees (ibid.). 
Although apparently on the increase, dependent 
self-employment remains fairly modest at the EU 
level, involving less than 5 % of all own-account 
workers (1.1 million people). However, this share 
remains high in countries such as the Netherlands 
(7 %), Cyprus (8 %) and Slovakia (12 %).
Platform workers are at particularly high risk of 
having unclear employment status. As revealed by 
the COLLEEM survey II, in the majority of cases, 
remuneration for platform work is based on the 
tasks performed (61 % of the total).  
Yet a significant proportion of platform workers 
– up to 51 % of those for whom platform work 
is their main activity – also receive fixed daily, 
weekly or monthly remuneration, which is typically 
associated with dependent employment.  
This reinforces the idea that, in many cases,  
the position of platform workers can be 
considered closer to that of employees than  
to independent contractors. This is also supported 
by the fact that most main platform workers 
consider their work to be a form of dependent 
employment. When asked about their current 
employment situation, more than 70 % of 
platform workers claim to be an employee and 
another 10 % self-employed. Most of them have 
a regular job as a main activity and engage in 
platform work as a secondary source of income.
No autonomy 
at all
Full
autonomy
Autonomy on 
the order of 
tasks
Autonomy on 
the content of 
tasks
36.7 % 39.5 %
13.9 % 9.9 %
Figure 36: Distribution of dependent self-employed, 
by degree of job autonomy
Source: JRC based on Eurostat LFS series detailed  
Annual Result
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Working conditions vary considerably across types  
of platform workers. Respondents who predominantly 
provide professional services are typically better 
paid than other types of platform workers,  
but also more likely to face stressful situations.  
On the other hand, non-professional online 
platform workers, while facing less stressful 
situations, are more likely to perform routine tasks  
(e.g. data entry, micro-tasks) and to have few 
learning opportunities. Importantly, workers’ 
conditions tend to worsen with the intensity  
of platform work. For instance, more than half 
of main platform workers consider their work 
via online platforms is often stressful. In terms 
of working hours, three quarters of the platform 
workers surveyed work less than 30 hours a 
week, although 13 % of platform workers report 
very long working hours, in excess of 60 hours 
a week. Ultimately, findings suggest that the 
working conditions of platform workers are very 
heterogeneous, depending on the type of work 
performed, its intensity and frequency (Box 12).
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Eurofound (2018a) has identified 10 different types  
of platform work which are already common in Europe. 
Three of these have been explored as regards their effects 
on working and employment conditions, in particular:
• On-location platform-determined routine work 
covers low-skilled work delivered in person and 
assigned to the worker by the platform. The platform 
often takes the role of the employer without, in most 
cases, providing an employment contract. This type 
of platform work offers workers good access to the 
labour market and low, but decent and relatively 
predictable, income. However, autonomy and career 
development opportunities are very limited and 
workers can suffer from low-quality working time 
and risks to physical health and safety.
• On-location worker-initiated moderately skilled 
work refers to low- to medium-skilled work refers 
to low- to medium-skilled work whereby tasks are 
selected and delivered on location by the worker. 
They benefit from autonomy in selecting tasks  
and setting prices, and dependence on the platform  
is limited. This type of platform work is also used  
by professionals to enlarge their client pool.
• Online contestant specialist work is highly skilled 
online work where the client selects the worker  
by means of a contest, often related to creative 
tasks. Workers benefit from a high level of flexibility 
as regards selecting and performing the tasks,  
as well as the opportunity to build up professional 
experience. However, work assignments and hence 
income are very unpredictable, and workers may 
experience high work intensity due to tight deadlines, 
as well as social and professional isolation.
box 12.  The many faces and challenges of platform work
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SUMMARY
Technological change is a key driver of structural change in the labour market. If we 
identify the tasks and jobs that new technologies are replacing, boosting or creating 
we will also be better able to understand the implications of these new developments 
from the point of view of inequality. And the last wave of technological change seems 
to promote employment polarisation. 
But there is a diversity of structural change patterns in EU labour markets, both at 
national and regional level. This suggests that many other factors beyond technology 
are at play and are mediating the effect technological change has on employment 
structures.
On the other hand, the dynamics of employment at the regional level show that re-
gions with higher innovation capacity are more likely to attract high-quality jobs. Those 
with high shares of high-paid jobs tend to cluster together within each country, usually 
around capital city regions, suggesting that some network effects do exist. Conversely, 
low-paid jobs are more common in peripheral regions. But capital city regions do not 
only attract skilled labour – they also attract low-skilled service workers. As a result, 
capital city regions are those most likely to show signs of employment polarisation.
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THE STRUCTURE OF 
JOBS AT REGIONAL 
LEVEL IN THE EU 
 4.1 Several factors affect job  
 structures: technology is a key one
Technological change does not only create and 
destroy jobs (see Chapter 1) but it also contributes 
significantly to transforming the overall structure  
of employment by shifting skills requirements 
(see Chapter 2). 
A main finding from the early literature is that, 
during the 1970s and 1980s, technological 
change was mainly ‘skill-biased’, leading to 
rising labour demand for highly skilled workers 
relative to lower-skilled ones. As a result of this 
trend, technical change would lead to growth 
in higher-skilled occupations relative to lower-
skilled ones, leading to an overall upgrading of the 
employment structure. This appeared to hold until 
the early 1980s when, in fact, a large share of the 
workforce in Europe shifted from low-skilled to 
mid- or high-skilled occupations. However, starting 
with computerisation in the late 1980s, the way 
technology affects the structure of jobs started  
to change (Goos et al., 2019).
The latest wave of technological change is seen as 
having a polarising effect on employment structure.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the latest waves of 
technological change, specifically computerisation, 
tend to substitute workers in routine occupations 
– typically in middle-wage occupations – while 
simultaneously expanding demand for jobs at both 
the bottom and top of wage and skills distribution. 
This pattern of ‘routine-biased’ technological 
change has been a key factor driving greater  
job polarisation in some EU countries over  
the past couple of decades (see Box 13; Craglia  
et al., 2018; Sebastian and Biagi, 2018). 
However, only a few countries experienced pervasive 
job polarisation over the past couple of decades. 
During the period 1995-2007, evidence for job 
polarisation was mainly found across western 
European countries, including France, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the UK (Fernández-Macías, 
2012). In some of these countries, notably the 
Netherlands and the UK, the job structure has 
also continued to polarise in more recent years 
(Panel A, Figure 37). 
Since 2011, other countries, including Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy and Romania, joined the group  
of EU Member States with polarising labour 
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across regions and 
countries in the EU, 
deepening territorial 
disparities.
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markets (Panel A, Figure 37), in contrast to other 
EU Member States, such as France and Germany, 
where job polarisation declined. Moreover,  
it is worth noting that, with a few exceptions 
(e.g. Italy), job-polarisation patterns have rarely 
been symmetrical, with employment gains 
often concentrated in the upper part of wage 
distribution.
4. The structure of jobs at regional level in the EU    
A growing body of empirical literature has been analysing 
the long-term transformations in occupational structure 
across European countries over the past few decades. 
Many studies point to an increase in employment in  
both low- and high-earning occupations, relative to those 
in the middle – which is typically defined as a pattern 
of job polarisation (see, for example, Goos et al., 2014; 
Michaels et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). A more recent 
strand of literature, focusing on regional differences  
in employment restructuring within individual EU  
Member States, also finds support for the job polarisation 
hypothesis in Germany (Dauth, 2014; Blien and Dauth, 
2016), Spain (Consoli and Barrioluengo, 2016; Torrejón, 
2019a; 2019b) and the UK (Kaplanis, 2007).  
However, other studies find the case for job polarisation 
in Europe rather limited, instead demonstrating a 
plurality of structural employment change patterns 
across EU Member States (Fernández-Macías, 2012; 
Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017).
These differences in findings can be attributed  
to a number of factors, including variations in the time 
period and country sample under consideration, unit 
of analysis (occupations vs. jobs), data sources and, 
more importantly, the way job polarisation is measured. 
Following Goos and Manning (2007), some studies 
measure job polarisation by estimating a quadratic 
regression model between changes in employment  
in a given job and the initial wage percentile for that job. 
Other studies try to construct an index that measures 
shifts away from the middle of the wage distribution  
(for instance, Jones and Green, 2009), while others 
look at relative change in employment by wage quintile 
(see Figure 37; Fernández-Macías, 2012; Eurofound, 
2017b). Although each of these approaches has its own 
merits and limitations, they all contribute to a better 
understanding of structural shifts in employment  
across Europe.
To explore patterns of structural employment change 
across 130 regions in 9 EU countries, the analysis 
presented in this chapter relies on an adjusted version  
of the methodology used by Eurofound (2017b), which 
looks at relative change in employment by wage tercile 
(rather than quintile) as regards the EU-9 average.  
Box 14 gives more details on this methodology.
box 13.  Job polarisation in the EU: an 
overview of the current evidence
  Technological 
change does not 
only create and 
destroy jobs but; 
it also contributes  
to transforming  
the overall structure  
of employment.
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Figure 37: Change in the number of employed people, by job wage quintile, in selected EU countries,  
2011 Q2 – 2016 Q2 (thousands)
Note: The x-axis shows absolute changes in employment in thousands for each quintile. The quintiles are sorted by wage level, from 
low on the left to high on the right. See Annex 2 in Eurofound (2017b) for further details. 
Source: Eurofound (2017b)
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Occupational upgrading was the most frequently 
observed pattern in employment change. Over the 
period 1995-2007, the majority of EU countries  
saw employment shares in the highest part  
of wage distribution growing faster than those 
at the bottom (Fernández-Macías, 2012). Such 
occupational upgrading has continued in several 
EU countries more recently, especially after 2013 
when economic growth in the EU strengthened 
(see Figure 37). In particular, employment shifted 
significantly towards higher-paid jobs in countries 
such as Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Germany and, 
to a lesser extent, Croatia and Estonia. A common 
feature across these countries is that jobs at the 
very top of the wage distribution (fifth quintile) 
grew the most, which suggests a slight tendency 
towards job polarisation, even in the context  
of occupational upgrading.
A few EU countries witnessed expanding shares  
of low- and middle-paid jobs, mostly after 2013.  
Over the period 1995-2007, only a few EU 
countries witnessed jobs in the bottom half of 
wage distribution growing faster than the rest 
(Fernández-Macías, 2012). However, this trend  
has become somewhat more prominent since 
2013, in most southern European countries  
but also in Ireland, Hungary and Slovenia (see 
Panel C in Figure 37, and Eurofound, 2017b).
Since 2013, the growing shares of low- and 
middle-paid jobs are not only the result of 
long-standing institutional and labour market 
features but they also reflect swings in the 
macroeconomic cycle (Eurofound, 2017b).  
For instance, following the sudden drop in  
the aftermath of the 2008-11 economic downturn 
in the EU, low-paid jobs rebounded considerably in 
countries such as Greece, Spain and Cyprus, mainly 
as the result of stronger economic growth (ibid.).
The diversity of employment change patterns across 
EU countries suggests that many factors other than 
technology are at play. Assuming that technological 
change is the only or most important factor 
shaping labour markets, observation of widespread 
job polarisation across all EU countries would be 
expected. Yet, as discussed above, over the past 
couple of decades, pervasive job polarisation has 
only occurred in a relatively small number of EU 
countries, with other EU Member States showing  
a plurality of patterns in occupational change.  
Such heterogeneity clearly suggests that there is no 
single driver but several factors that simultaneously 
affect the shape of labour market developments in 
the EU (Autor, 2010; Eurofound, 2017b).
Other interlinked megatrends, such as globalisation  
and de-industrialisation, strongly influence changes  
in employment structures. Whilst it has been 
confirmed that technology has a fundamental 
role in shaping long-term labour market 
transformations, a number of studies point 
to other complementary forces. In particular, 
recent research emphasises the role played by 
the offshoring of routine tasks (Oldenski, 2014), 
import competition (Autor et al., 2013; Keller 
and Utar, 2016) and de-industrialisation (OECD, 
2017) as other key drivers of employment change. 
In particular, it has been found that declining 
manufacturing sectors account for around one 
third of the overall job polarisation observed 
across OECD countries between 1995 and 2015 
(ibid.). At the same time, developments observed 
in occupational structure also reflect changes 
in workforce structure related to higher female 
participation in the labour market, increasing 
labour mobility, and the educational upgrading  
of the population (Eurofound, 2017b). For instance, 
job polarisation in Germany was found to be 
slower than in other western European countries, 
due to the strong apprenticeship system which 
reduced incentives for firms to substitute these 
skilled workers (Rendall and Weiss, 2016).
Institutions and labour-market policies mediate the 
effect of technological change and other megatrends 
on the structure of employment. Country-specific 
institutions and policies also appear to mitigate 
the labour-market consequences of technological 
change, especially for workers at the lower end  
of wage distribution (Eurofound, 2017b;  
4. The structure of jobs at regional level in the EU    
75 4. The structure of jobs at regional level in the EU    
Hurley et al., 2013; Oesch, 2013; Tahlin, 2007).  
In particular, stronger unions, high minimum wages 
and generous unemployment benefits, compressing 
the wage structure, may have contributed to 
limiting the creation of a low-wage sector in some 
EU countries (Oesch and Rodríguez, 2011).
 4.2 Job structures and their evolution 
  vary widely across EU regions
Observing employment shifts at the regional level 
can provide key insights into the variety of patterns 
across the EU. Whilst interesting, the analysis 
of structural employment changes at Member-
State level often hides highly heterogeneous 
employment dynamics across regions within the 
same Member State. Yet, and despite the large 
amount of evidence both at international and 
sub-national level (see Box 13), little is known 
about changes in occupational structure across 
European regions in many countries. The analysis 
presented below aims to fill this gap. The JRC 
and Eurofound have conducted a new study 
observing employment shifts at the regional level 
for a sample of 130 regions across 9 EU Member 
States – representing around two thirds of the 
population employed in the EU-28 in 2018. The 
study systematically investigates the diversity 
of employment shifts across EU regions, setting 
the EU-9 average employment structure as a 
common benchmark against which regional 
employment structures and shifts over time 
can be assessed (see Box 14 for details on the 
methodology).
Regional employment structures and their evolution over 
time are too diverse to be measured and interpreted 
consistently using traditional methodologies (see Box 13). 
A way of alleviating this complexity is to use the overall 
EU-9 employment structure as a common benchmark 
for all European regions, then analyse changes as either 
convergence towards or divergence from that structure.  
To provide a sufficiently synthetic way of analysing change 
in employment structure by regions, the following steps 
were taken: 1) A matrix of ‘jobs’ – i.e. occupation in a 
specific sector is created for each region; 2) Each job is 
ranked in terms of its percentile position in the wage 
distribution of each of 9 EU countries; 3) The percentile 
positions for any given job are averaged across all 9 
EU countries, to compute the weighted average percentile 
position of each job across the whole EU-9; 4) The average 
EU-9 percentile position is then normalised again according 
to the overall EU employment structure; and 5) The overall 
EU employment structure is divided into three equal-
sized groups (terciles) of jobs, ranked from the lowest to 
the highest wage. Jobs assigned to the bottom tercile of 
wage distribution are classified as low-paid jobs; those 
in the top tercile as high-paid jobs; and those in the 
middle third as middle-paid jobs. According to the way in 
which employment shifts across terciles, four patterns of 
structural employment transformation can be identified: 1) 
Polarisation: job growth in the top and bottom terciles is 
faster than in the middle; 2) Upgrading: job growth in the 
upper tercile is faster than in the bottom one; 3) Middling: 
jobs in the middle tercile expand faster than jobs in the 
other two; 4) Downgrading: jobs in the lower tercile grow 
faster than jobs in the upper ones.
Comparing regional job structures and their changes with 
a common benchmark has a number of advantages:
• It ensures a high degree of comparability, as jobs 
classified as high-, middle- or low-paid are exactly 
the same across all regions, according to their 
average wage in all the countries together.
• It allows for an analysis of how regions' employment 
structures compare to the EU average, from both a 
static and a dynamic perspective.
box 14.  Measuring changes in regional employment structures relative to the EU-9: a tercile 
approach
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• It provides a consistent framework for analysing 
the degree of convergence and divergence in 
regional job structures compared to the EU average.
It is important to keep in mind that, as shown in this 
chapter, regional patterns of employment transformation 
must be interpreted as a deviation from the EU-9 average 
occupational structure. Therefore, to have a clear 
understanding of regional employment structure and 
shifts over time, it is important to consider how the EU 
9 average job structure has evolved over time. Evidence 
shows that, since 2002, despite some differences 
depending on the sub-period under consideration, jobs  
in the top and middle thirds of the EU-9 wage distribution 
have expanded faster than those at the bottom  
(Figure 38). 
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Figure 38: Total change in the number of jobs by wage tercile across EU-9 countries (millions)
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFS
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Looking at changes in job structures across EU regions 
between 2002 and 2017, no prevalent pattern  
of employment transformation emerges. On average, 
changes in the occupational structures in different 
European regions tend to be similar to those  
of their respective countries. For instance, in line 
with what is observed for the whole country, since 
2002, the employment structure of virtually  
all Polish regions has upgraded compared to 
the EU-9 average. However, there are cases 
where job structures across regions of the same 
country have evolved very differently from one 
another – for example in France and Spain. And 
while there are some signs of convergence across 
EU regions – particularly with eastern European 
regions converging towards the average European 
occupational structure – the overall degree of 
diversity across regional occupational structures  
in Europe is growing rather than shrinking.
Around one third of the regions analysed experienced 
greater job polarisation. The distinctive feature  
of a polarising labour market is the shift away  
of employment from middle-paid jobs to low- 
and high-paid ones. Between 2002 and 2017,  
a similar pattern was only observed across most 
regions in France, the UK and Sweden, as well 
as several Spanish ones (Figure 39). The main 
underlying trend in many of these regions was 
the decline in middle-paid manufacturing jobs 
which was offset by growth in both high- and 
low-paid ones in the service sector. 
Occupational upgrading took place mainly in Spanish and 
Polish regions. Virtually all Polish regions and  
a few Spanish ones have witnessed a considerable 
improvement in their job structure, experiencing 
falling numbers of low-paid jobs and a rising 
prevalence of middle- and high-paid jobs (Figure 39). 
  Patterns  
of employment 
restructuring 
vary considerably 
between  
EU regions, 
more so than  
between countries.
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This improvement, especially among Polish 
regions, is largely the result of falling shares of 
agricultural employment – where the prevalence 
of low-paid jobs is typically high – being 
compensated mainly by growth in mid- and 
high-paid jobs in services and manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, the share of employment in 
agriculture, and more generally the share of 
low-paid jobs, remains far higher in these fast-
converging regions than in most other regions 
within their respective country and in Europe as a 
whole (see section 4.3).
In contrast, in several regions, the labour market 
structure has been downgraded considerably. Since 
2002, regions in Germany and Italy, as well as 
some in Spain, have witnessed a reduction in the 
share of high-paid jobs combined with growing 
shares in both middle- and low-paid jobs. This 
trend is driven by regions with an intermediate 
population density, where fewer jobs in high-
paid sectors have been compensated for by the 
expansion of mid- and low-paid employment 
(Figure 39). For some regions in southern Italy 
and Spain, where in 2002 the job structure was 
already lagging behind the majority of other EU-9 
regions, the expansion of low-paid jobs has led to 
further divergence from the EU-9 average. 
Few regions have witnessed a growing concentration 
of employment in the middle of wage distribution. 
In a small fraction of EU regions (mostly in 
Czechia, Italy and Germany) middle-paid jobs 
have expanded faster than low- and high paid 
ones. As a result, the occupational structure 
of employment has gone through a process of 
‘middling’ – actually showing a pattern of change 
which is the opposite of polarisation. In some 
cases, such as in Czechian regions, growing 
shares in middle-paid jobs resulted mainly from 
employment shifting away from low-paid jobs, 
and was only marginally due to shrinking shares 
of high-paid employment. Conversely, the process 
of middling across German and Italian regions 
was mostly driven by employment shifts from 
high- to middle-paid jobs – a pattern resembling 
occupational downgrading rather than middling. 
Regions which are innovation leaders according 
to the EU Regional Innovation Scoreboards have 
on average much larger shares of high-paid jobs 
than regions which are considered moderate 
innovators – a gap that has been increasing 
since 2002. Meanwhile, the average share of 
low-paid jobs in these innovation leader regions 
is around two thirds lower than in moderate 
innovator regions (Figure 40). With the exception 
of regional innovation leaders, neither strong nor 
moderate regional innovators have shown signs of 
job polarisation. In fact, in both groups of regions, 
the share of middle-paid jobs has increased since 
2002, with stagnant or even falling shares of high-  
and low-paid jobs. 
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  Regions  
with higher  
innovation  
capacity tend to 
have more  
high-paid jobs  
and less low-paid 
ones, whilst also 
showing some signs 
of increasing job 
polarisation.
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Of course, diverging regional employment 
transformations do not only reflect variations  
in regional innovation potential, but also different 
patterns of industrial specialisation, degree of 
population density, and urbanisation  
(see next section).
 4.3 Stark differences in employment 
 structure between peripheral  
 and capital regions
The prevalence of low-paid jobs in some peripheral 
regions is around twice as large as that of core EU 
regions. Although some of the peripheral European 
regions — most notably Polish, with a few 
Spanish ones — have experienced a remarkable 
upgrade in their employment composition over 
the past 15 years, their employment structure 
remains far from convergent with that prevalent  
in most EU regions. 
This is particularly the case for regions located 
in southern Italy and Spain, as well as for some 
Polish ones, where the share of low-paid jobs 
exceeded 50 % in 2017. However, to a lesser 
extent, relatively high shares of low-paid jobs  
are also observed in some regions of France  
and the UK (Figure 41).  
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Figure 39: Regional employment changes relative to the EU-9 average, 2002-17
Note: The horizontal axis shows by how much the percentage point difference between the share of low-paid jobs (lowest tercile) 
in the region vis-à-vis the EU-9 average (approximately 33.3 % – see Box 14 for details) in 2017 changed when compared to 2002. 
The vertical axis indicates by how much the percentage point difference between the share of high-paid jobs (highest tercile) 
in the region vis-à-vis the EU-9 (again, approximately 33.3 % by construction) in 2017 changed relative to 2002.
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFS
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Figure 40: Regional employment shares, by job tercile and innovation group, 2017
Note: The regional innovation clusters are based on an adjusted version of the classification presented in the EU Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard (RIS) 2017. The innovation leaders group includes 31 regions with RIS performance over 20 % above the EU average; 
the strong innovators group includes 75 regions with performance between 90 % and 120 % of the EU average, while the moderate 
innovators group includes 23 regions with performance between 50 % and 90 % of the EU average. For further details on the number 
and type of RIS 2017 indicators, see the EU Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2017.
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFS and EU Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2017
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Regions with very high shares of high-paid jobs tend 
to cluster together within each country, with some 
exceptions. In almost all of the nine EU Member 
States analysed, capital city regions and their 
neighbours have a significantly higher share  
of high-paid jobs than the rest of country.
 
In the UK, Sweden, Belgium and, to some 
extent, Germany and France, regions with 
relatively higher shares of high-paid jobs are 
often geographical neighbours, suggesting the 
existence of a network effect across regions. 
However, this is not always the case – for 
instance, capital city regions in Spain and Poland 
are bordering regions where the share of high-
paid jobs is fairly low (Figure 42).
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  The share 
of high-paid 
jobs in capital 
city regions  
and their 
neighbours 
is significantly 
higher than 
in the rest of 
the country.
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Figure 41: Share of low-paid jobs, by region (2017, %)
Note: The share of low-paid jobs across regions is measured following the methodology outlined in Box 14. As explained 
in greater detail in Box 14, jobs in each region are first ranked on the base of some criterion, mainly the mean hourly wage, and then 
an aggregated EU-9 job-wage ranking is then calculated based on the employment-weighted average job ranking across the 9 Member 
States analysed. Therefore, the share of low-paid jobs reflect the percentage of jobs in each region which belong to the bottom 
third (first tercile) of the aggregate job-wage distribution in the EU-9.
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFS
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Despite considerable improve-
ment since 2002, the share of 
low-paid jobs remains sizable 
in some Polish regions.
Germany shows quite 
low and homogenous 
shares of low-paid 
jobs across regions.
Regional differences in the 
prevalence of low-paid jobs 
are widest in France, Italy, 
and Poland.
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The share of 
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regions, but with 
large differences 
across countries. 
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Figure 42: Share of high-paid jobs, by region (2017, %)
Note: The share of high-paid jobs across regions is measured following the methodology outlined in Box 14. As explained 
in greater detail in Box 14, jobs in each region are first ranked on the base of some criterion, mainly the mean hourly wage, and then 
an aggregated EU-9 job-wage ranking is then calculated based on the employment-weighted average job ranking across the 9 Member 
States analysed. Therefore, the share of high-paid jobs reflect the percentage of jobs in each region which belong to the top third 
(third tercile) of the aggregate job-wage distribution in the EU-9. 
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFS
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Despite considerable improve-
ment since 2002, the share of 
low-paid jobs remains sizable 
in some Polish regions.
Germany shows quite 
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shares of low-paid 
jobs across regions.
Regional differences in the 
prevalence of low-paid jobs 
are widest in France, Italy, 
and Poland.
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Capital city regions show a much larger share of high-
paid jobs than other regions within their respective 
countries. This is especially the case for the capital 
city regions in Czechia, France, Sweden and the 
UK. For instance, while the share of high-paid 
jobs in the Prague region is around 15 percentage 
points (pp) above the EU-9 average, this share 
remains below the EU-9 average in six of the 
other seven Czechian regions (Figure 43). This is 
the result of a long-term trend which has seen 
capital city regions, and more generally highly 
urbanised areas, benefiting disproportionally from 
employment growth, mostly in the highly paid 
segment of the workforce. Indeed, on average, 
the share of high-paid jobs in capital regions grew 
from 41.9 % in 2002 to 44.7 % in 2017.
It is worth noting that, while some capital city 
regions lead in their own country, they lag behind 
many other regions in the rest of the EU. This is 
notably the case for Rome, Madrid and Warsaw 
regions, which in 2017 had by far the lowest share 
of high-paid jobs among all capital city regions 
analysed, also below almost any other region in 
Sweden or the UK, for example. (Box 15).
In terms of the prevalence of low-paid jobs, differences 
between capital city regions and the rest are less 
stark. Within each of the nine EU Member States 
analysed, capital city regions are among those 
with the lowest shares of low-paid jobs relative to 
the EU-9 average (Figure 44). However, the share 
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Figure 43: Difference in the share of high-paid jobs across regions in 2017 (pp deviation from EU-9 average)
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFS
  Capital city regions 
and highly urbanised 
areas benefit 
disproportionally    
from employment  
growth in high  
paid-jobs.
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of this type of job in capital city regions does not 
differ dramatically from that of other regions in their 
respective country – unlike the differences observed 
in the shares of high-paid jobs (see above). 
Actually, in a number of countries, including 
Belgium, Italy and Poland, capital city regions have 
larger shares of low-paid jobs than some other 
regions in their country. This corroborates the 
idea that capital city regions do not only attract 
talent but also large numbers of workers who find 
employment in traditionally low-skilled services. 
As a result, labour markets in capital city regions 
are those most likely to show signs of polarisation. 
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Figure 44: Difference in the share of low-paid jobs across regions in 2017 (pp deviation from EU-9 average)
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFSLFS
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The direction and magnitude of employment 
restructuring taking place over the past 15 years 
have varied considerably between capital city 
regions in the nine EU Member States analysed. 
The most remarkable employment restructuring 
has taken place in the Warsaw region. Between 
2002 and 2017, the share of high-paid jobs rose 
from 33 % to 43 %, whereas that of low-paid jobs 
dropped from 43 % to around 30 % (Figure 45). 
As a result, the composition of employment has 
strongly converged towards that of capital city 
regions with higher income per capita, such as 
those regions in Berlin or Paris.
Such convergence was also possible because both 
the Berlin and Paris regions have witnessed a 
simultaneous trend in growing shares in low-paid 
jobs and declining percentages of high-paid jobs 
vis-à-vis the EU-9 average. In fact, capital city 
regions are typically more likely to have a large 
service sector and, as such, to attract workers 
both at the high and low ends of wage distribution. 
This trend appears to be particularly strong in 
the Madrid and London regions and, to a much 
lesser extent, in the Brussels and Stockholm 
ones. Indeed, since 2002, in all these capital city 
regions, both the shares of high- and low-paid 
jobs have increased when compared to the EU-9 
average.
Finally, the Rome region is the only one showing 
clear signs of divergence from other European 
capital city regions, with the shares of high-paid 
jobs falling below the EU-9 average between 2002 
and 2017, while the share of low-paid jobs over 
the same period moved above that average.
box 15.  Employment restructuring in capital city regions: signs of convergence?
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Figure 45: Shares of high- and low-paid jobs across capital city regions, 2002 and 2017
Source: JRC and Eurofound calculations based on EU-LFS
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This report aims to shed light on some of the key 
drivers to be taken into account when assessing  
the effect of new technologies on the future  
of work and skills. 
A careful review of existing evidence, combined 
with new JRC research, suggests that uncertainty 
regarding the magnitude and nature of technology-
driven changes to labour markets and education 
systems will endure for some time – at least 
until more and better data are collected about 
the nature of work, workplace organisation and 
complementarity between humans and machines. 
This does not mean, however, that societies and 
governments must wait to prepare themselves  
to respond to the challenges ahead. In fact,  
quite the opposite.
There is clear evidence that the digital age is already 
disrupting labour markets and transforming skills needs 
in the EU.
It is also clear that the speed at which new 
technologies are spreading across workplaces and 
societies raises difficult questions for policymakers 
in the EU. These include, for example, the design of 
all levels of education, the provision of and access 
to training and lifelong learning, the regulation 
of labour markets, the future of tax and benefits 
systems, and the protection of social rights.
It is therefore crucial that policymakers and other 
stakeholders at EU, Member State and regional level 
act now, and not only to address emerging policy 
challenges. Policy interventions must also aim to shape 
the future world of work and employment. 
Only in this way will it be possible to seize  
the opportunities and limit the challenges created 
by the ongoing wave of technological progress.
In a fast-changing environment which has 
important implications for EU policies, ensuring  
the close monitoring of developments and 
deepening the evidence base to design future-proof 
policies is of the utmost importance.
Although more and better evidence is being 
developed, more needs to be done to ensure that 
the EU is well equipped to deal with emerging 
challenges. Over the last two years, the JRC has 
expanded and deepened its research activities 
around the changing nature of work and skills.  
It will continue to provide updated policy-relevant 
evidence in the future to ensure that policy 
responses meet the challenges.
It will also be crucial to ensure that the policy 
discourse and decisions are aligned with societal 
values, as policymakers will have to face difficult 
choices to shape the future of work and skills  
in Europe.
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ENDNOTES
1 The 15 countries included in the survey were: UK, Turkey, Spain, Italy, Germany, India, Ireland, Hungary, Czechia, 
Greece, South Africa, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania and Egypt. 
2 Meaning, understanding machines and how to interact with machines, and the sea of information being 
generated by machines, respectively.
3 Learning resulting from daily activities related to work, family or leisure. It is not organised or structured in terms 
of objectives, time or learning support. In most cases, Informal learning is unintentional from the learner’s 
perspective (Cedefop, 2014).
4 Learning which is embedded in planned activities not explicitly designated as learning (in terms of learning 
objectives, learning time or learning support), but which include an important learning element. Non-formal 
learning is intentional from the learner’s point of view. It typically does not lead to certification (Cedefop 2014).
5 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/moocknowledge
6 Survey evidence suggests that this share might actually be higher (Eurofound, 2017).
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